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Turkey seeks to become a full partner in the "European club" by joining the 
European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU) in addition to her current 
membership in NATO. This has not happened despite a long and intensive effort by 
Turkey to be accepted, nor will it happen in the foreseeable future. The advantages 
Turkish membership would bring are outweighed by EU concerns about foreign, 
economic and domestic policy. Most significant among these are increased exposure to 
Greek-Turkish issues, Turkish economic strength in areas of little interest to Europe, and 
an exploding population which is expected to surpass Germany's by 2010. Europeans 
also question Turkey's democratic tradition, her human rights record and more recently, 
her secularization. Non-admission, combined with the demise of the Soviet Union, has 
caused Turkey to begin acting as her own foreign policy center. The result is a shifting 
paradigm in Turkish foreign relations which often sees Turkish initiatives at odds with 
those of her post-WWII traditional allies. This Turkish trend toward unilateralism will 
continue at least as long she is excluded from the EU and WEU and may, in fact, have 
developed its own momentum. This must be clearly understood to prevent mutual 
estrangement as Turkey takes initiatives (such as the recent advances to Iran and Libya) 
which are unpopular with her American and European allies. 
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Full Turkish integration into the two most important purely European political and 
security structures has progressed slowly despite the stated goal of Turkey to become a 
full member of the European Union (EU) in 1963 and the Western European Union 
(WEU) in 1987. While the nations of eastern Europe have only been able to aspire to EU 
membership since 1991, Turkey submitted her formal application in 1987 after a history of 
close cooperation beginning with the Cold War. Despite this, it appears that her bid to 
enter the EU and WEU as a full member will be eclipsed by at least three foremer east 
bloc nations--Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary and possibly by Malta and Cyprus 
before she perhaps is finally admitted. 
The reasons for this slowness are multiple and are related to the complex situation 
in which Turkey finds herself as well as to a strong tendency towards risk avoidance by 
the EU member nations. The main reasons for not allowing Turkey full membership hinge 
upon issues such as poor Greek-Turkish relations, alleged human rights infractions in 
dealing with terrorism, and economic competitiveness and population growth. Underlying 
these very real issues, and much harder to document, may be an element of "Europeanism" 
which tacitly acknowledges Turkey as an outsider not fully within the European tradition. 
Although this "Europeanism" appears insufficient to stop Turkish accession to the EU and 
WEU, it may be a factor in causing European leaders to look more closely at the very 
tangible obstacles to Turkish integration into the EU and WEU which has ramifications for 
European and American foreign policy. 
xvu 
Europeans and Turks may ask why Turkish entrance into the EU and WEU may be 
important in the first place. The primary reason is stability--within Turkey, the regions 
surrounding Turkey and even Europe itself Although Europeans do not overwhelmingly 
espouse Turkish membership in their most important organizations, they almost 
universally believe that regional stability, broadly defined to include all of the Eurasian 
land mass (and Mrica), is a vital interest. Exporting stability to Turkey and her neighbors 
is commonly cited as a major benefit of allowing Turkey into the EU and the WEU. 
Europeans know this but they do not, from a Turkish perspective, seem to realize that 
failure to say "yes" to accession often enough begins to sound like "no." 
The political and economic consequences for Europe of not allowing Turkey full 
EU and WEU membership over the near term (5-10 years) are probably quite low. Over 
the medium and long term adherence to the status quo of having Turkey near, but not in, 
involves increased risk to Turkish and possibly European stability unless European and 
Turkish leaders take appropriate actions to accommodate a situation different from each 
polities' stated goal of membership. 
Many European leaders fail to realize is that their 'near term' is Turkey's 'present.' 
European leaders are still behaving as ifbipolar assumptions remain valid--most 
importantly that Turkey will remain relatively cooperative and supportive regardless of 
European complacency. The reality is that two key events serve to modify this 
assumption--the end of the Cold War, and the beginning of the Second Gulf War. Prior to 
the Second Gulf War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, Turkey did not have a great 
deal oflatitude with respect to choosing her allies. The Second GulfWar and the 
XVlll 
reluctance ofNATO's European allies to honor, without reservation, their Article 5 
guarantees indicated to Turkish leaders that they should consider looking further for 
security guarantees. The end of the Soviet Union enabled them to do this. The result it 
that since 1991, Turkey has been much more willing to develop her foreign policy 
independent ofEurope. 
Europeans do not seem to realize that Turkey is, in fact, following a different 
paradigm of relations since they remain focused on the appearances of closer ties that the 
1 January 1996 Customs Union (CU) engender. Additionally, the change in the paradigm 
may not be important now because a true European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) 
is still in the future, hence Turkish membership in NATO is sufficient to meet European 
security needs--with the comfortable knowledge that the United States is also there should 
there be a situation involving Turkey. 
A Turkey partially outside of the EU and the WEU is not necessarily a bad thing 
so long as both polities know where they stand. The current European policy, though, of 
ambiguity is perceived by Turks as unfair and ultimately may prove harmful to both Turks 
and EU members alike. Europe is still taking Turkey for granted based on a 'business as 
usual' approach. Turkey appears to be exploring other options while keeping the 
European door as fully open as possible. The EU and WEU members need to realize that 
there has been a change in Turkish-European relations and that a more profound one 
could be in the future ifEurope does not make her position clear. Essentially, the EU and 
WEU should either tell Turkey that they only want ties that are as close as possible short 
XIX 
of full membership, or they should clearly link the milestones that are included in the CU 
treaty to future EU and subsequent WEU membership. 
Europeans currently enjoy an unlikely situation. Through CU, they have excellent 
access to the benefits of Turkish EU membership without the responsibility, and through 
NATO they enjoy an equivalent relationship with the WEU. This state is probably not 
sustainable as Turkish leader seek clarification or face the specter of repudiation at home 
for failure to reach closure. The paradigm of Turkish-European relations has already 
changed once and it seems likely it will shift again--the question is one of 'when' rather 
than 'if' 
Europeans (and Americans) should not expect to be as fortunate when the next 
shift in Turkish foreign policy occurs. The time to act is now and ifEuropeans are 
unwilling to clarifY their position on Turkish integration into the EU and WEU, then the 
United States should be willing to put pressure on the Europeans to do so. 
XX 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THESIS STATEMENT 
Full Turkish integration into the two most important purely European political and 
security structures has progressed slowly despite the stated goal of Turkey to become a 
full member of the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU).1 
While the nations of eastern Europe have only been able to aspire to EU membership since 
1991, Turkey submitted her formal application in 1987 after a history of close cooperation 
beginning with the Cold War. Despite this, it appears that her bid to enter the EU and 
WEU as a full member will be eclipsed by at least three former east bloc nations-Poland, 
Czech Republic and Hungary and possibly by Malta and Cyprus before she perhaps is 
finally admitted. 2 The reasons for this slowness are multiple and are related to the 
complex situation in which Turkey finds herself as well as to a strong tendency towards 
risk avoidance by the EU member nations. Very broadly, the primary public reasons 
delaying Turkey's admission to these two key European institutions are issues of 
economics, foreign policy and the democratic tradition. Underlying these very real issues, 
and much harder to document, may be an element of "Europeanism" which tacitly 
acknowledges Turkey as an outsider not fully within the European tradition. 3 Although 
1 Ziya Oni~, "Turkey In The Post-Cold War Era: In Search ofldentity," Middle East Journal, 
(Volume 49, No. 1, Winter 1995), p. 53. 
2 
"EU-Sondergipfel bekraftigt Ziele und Zeitplan filr die Reform der Europaischen Union," 
Deutschland Nachrichten, (11 October 1996), p. l. 
3 An investigation of the Index To International Public Opinion surveys compiled from 1987 to 
1993 indicates that Turkey has a definite perception problem among "average" European civilians. This 
perception problem appears to stem from two issues: a lack of knowledge of Turks and Turkey and at 
least some level of prejudice against Turks. These surveys, which are included in Appendix B, will be 
addressed in greater detail throughout this paper. Nowhere in my research, have I found any significant 
evidence suggesting a public bias against Turkey and Turks among Europe's senior leaders. 
1 
this "Europeanism" appears insufficient to stop Turkish accession to the EU and WEU, it 
may be a factor in causing European leaders to look more closely at the very tangible 
obstacles to Turkish integration into the EU and WEU. Regardless of whether or not 
differences in culture and religion play a significant role in keeping Turkey out, the 
impediments engendered over issues such as poor Greek-Turkish relations, alleged human 
rights infractions in dealing with terrorism, and economic competitiveness and population 
growth appear more than sufficient to ensure that Turkey does not become a full member 
of the EU or WEU within the next decade at least--and probably much longer than that. 
Based on non-admission to the European club, Turkey may be forced to reconsider 
her foreign policy options. In particular, it may make sense to her, especially with the end 
of bipolarism, to modify her Cold War foreign policy paradigm and act significantly more 
independently of her traditional European and North American allies. This has the 
potential to increase political and economic competitiveness with Europe and the United 
States and possibly to lead to fallings-out as Turkey takes actions contrary to her allies' 
wishes. 
This, in fact, seems to be the current case in Turkish politics although the present 
example of Prime Minister Erbakan and his Welfare Party is an extreme example. A much 
more moderate approach to Turkey's need to consider her foreign and domestic policy 
formulation separately from European and American leads is Ziya Oni~ who believes that 
"Turkey should come to terms with the fact that its heritage draws from both the East and 
the West. [sic] ... Turkey possesses a broader identity that extends beyond a purely 
European one. This broader identity should be considered an asset rather than a weakness 
2 
or disadvantage."4 To him, Turkey should choose when to act as her own geopolitical 
center independent of Europe and when to act in concert with Europe on issues such as 
economics, terrorism and foreign policy. 
An understanding of Turkey's snail-pace integration into European organizations 
and institutions not only affects European and Turkish policy makers but is important to 
American foreign policy makers as well. Without an understanding ofTurkish and 
European issues concerning Turkey's desire to formally become Europe's southeastern 
border, American foreign policy makers run the risk of developing a flawed policy that 
does not fully mesh with that of either Europe or Turkey in the Middle East, Balkans, 
Caucasus and Central Asia and which could cause difficulties in American dealings with 
Turkey5 It is probably true that American security and political interests in Turkey 
resemble Europe's more than they differ, but it is also true that there is an "Atlantic filter" 
which affords the United States greater flexibility than Europe when dealing with Turkey. 
This filter enables the United States to distance herself from European concerns regarding 
Turkish immigrant problems as well as cultural and religious differences. Distance, 
combined with a strong post-World War II history of friendship during the Cold War and 
4 Oni~, pp. 48-49. 
5 Recent examples of a lack of American understanding of Turkey's situation with respect to 
Europe with a negative impact on American foreign policy include Germany's clear reluctance to support 
Turkey as a NATO ally against Iraq in the Second Gulf War and Turkey's more recent look to America's 
enemies, notably Iran and Libya, as trading partners. In early May 1995, under Prime Minister Tansu 
<;illar, Turkey signed a 23-year natural gas agreement with Iran indicating that Turkish independence of 
American desires is not dependent upon who has the governmental lead in Turkey. From Mahmut Bali 
Aykan, "Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations Concerning Persian Gulf Security in the Post-Cold 
War Era: 1989-1995," Middle East Journal, (Volume 50, No.3, Summer 1996), pp. 354-355. 
3 
Second Gulf War, allows America to be perhaps more objective in her dealings with 
Turkey vis-a-vis her European friends. 6 
B. OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT 
1. Relevance 
Europe is at a crossroads between nationalism and supra-nationalism as it enters 
the 21st century. If Europe is to become something greater than the sum of its parts, it 
must collectively decide how to define itself as well as to define its interests. Even before 
the Turin Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) which began on March 29, 1996, EU 
member nations were displaying stress as they came to grips with diverse national interests 
in plotting EU strategy into the next century. The ultimate question the European nations 
must answer is what will be the future pattern ofEuropean Union growth as well as that 
of closely related organizations such as the WEU. 7 
Growth of the EU can take two broad directions. 8 . The first of these is 
"deepening," meaning that the EU would establish a moratorium on accepting new full 
members into its polity. The second is "widening," which means accepting new full 
members as soon as they meet certain minimum standards of economic, political, military 
6 The "First Gulf War" was the eight year Iran-Iraq war over their international land borders as 
well as the Shatt al Arab waterway which ended in 1990. The Second Gulf War was the American-led 
coalition which restored Kuwaiti sovereignty in 1991. . 
7
"Resolution on (i) Parliament's opinion on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference; 
and (ii) evaluation of the work of the Reflection Group and definition of the political priorities of the 
European Parliament with a view to the Intergovernmental Conference" based on the Dury/Maij-Weggen 
report (A4-0068/96), Internet address: http://www.cec.lu/en/agenda/igc-home/eu-doc/parlment/ 
opinion.html, (13 March 1996). This article contains a summary of the IGC points finally "agreed" upon. 
8 
There are numerous books and articles describing the progression of European unity. Two 
references on this are: John Pinder, European Communi tv. The Building of a Union, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995) and George Ross, Jacques Delors and European Integration, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
4 
and human rights performance.9 There is a middle ground answer as well which is actually 
a subcategory of widening-that is to simultaneously accept new members as they are 
ready while attempting to strengthen bonds among the "core" members. 10 All three 
concepts have their adherents and positive aspects; however, the goal of this thesis is not 
to analyze their merits, but rather to examine the issue ofEU and WEU growth with 
respect to one of the most controversial accessions-Turkey. 
In many ways, Turkey faces a future policy situation very similar to that of Europe. 
Specifically, she must decide if her interests will best be served by "going it alone" 
(deepening), finding other allies (widening), or maintaining separate, but friendly relations 
with the EU while remaining separate from that polity (a subcategory of widening). Just 
as in the EU viewpoint, there is more at stake than simple economic, political and security 
concerns. 11 
Turkey, like the EU, must also ensure union is compatible with her 21 81 century 
interests which are at least as controversial for Turks as for Europeans. Many analysts 
refer to Turkey as a "bridge" nation-superficially due to its geographical location at the 
crossroads ofEurope, Asia and the Middle East-but more importantly because of her 
9 Zalmay Khalilzad, ed., Strategic Apraisall996, (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1996) has a 
concise summary of the widening versus deepening debate in Ronald D. Asmus' chapter, "Western 
Europe," especially pp. 54-60. 
lODaily Support Annex. West Europe, (Washington, DC: Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, 1 April 1996). Various articles from this issue demonstrate the debate. See "EU "Heads of 
Government Accept Principle of Flexibility" [Rome Radio], p. 9; "EU: Spain's Gonzales Expects No 
Changes in EU Policy [Madrid Radio], p. 9; and "Sweden: Analysts Fear Growing Reluctance on EU 
Enlargement", p. 18. See also "Une interview du ministre des Affaires europeennes, Michel Barnier: <<II 
ne faut surtout pas construire deux Europe>>", Le Figaro, (11 January 1996). Numerous other references 
from all European countries are available. 
11 See Oni~, pp. 48-68. 
5 
mixed cultural heritage. 12 Ultimately, Turkey, like Europe, must choose which one of 
three major paths to follow into the future although the stakes are proportionately higher 
as they have strong implications for Turkish economics, security and culture. Turkey, 
then, must decide whether she will look north towards Europe, outwards to the Middle 
East, the Caucasus, Transcaucus and Central Asia, or inwards for her Weltanschauung. 
2. Methodology & Realism 
a. Levels of Analysis-Realism 
Realism is often associated with power politics as espoused by such 
notables as Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger. Typically, realism looks at differences 
and conflict points more than at reasons for peaceful coexistence. There is, however, a 
subcategory of realism which logically follows from the realists' prisoner's dilemma. 
Essentially it boils down to "democracies do not fight one another" although this 
statement is rather more specific than it should be. Perhaps a better restatement is that 
"mainstream countries do not fight one another. " 13 Rephrasing the concept this way 
makes it unnecessary to unequivocally state that Turkey is a democracy-a question many 
Europeans have and which will be addressed later in this thesis (see Appendix B, Table 
12 
Examples of references to Turkey as a "bridge" nation include Ian 0. Lesser's essay "Bridge or 
Barrier" in Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1993), p. 99; Heinz Kramer, "Die Tilrkei als Regionalmacht, Briicke und Modell: 
Strategisch-politische Zerr- und Wunschbilder deutscher und westlicher Tilrkeipolitik," sponsored by 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, (Ebenhausen, BRD: August 1995); Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and 
the West," Foreign Affairs, (Spring 1991, Vol. 70, No.2), p. 39 and it is one ofthe essential assumptions 
of Oni~' article. 
13 
Of course, an exception that readily comes to mind given this topic is Turkey and Greece, but 
even these two traditional enemies have found a way to at least partially work around their differences 
short of major war. The 1974 Cyprus War did not escalate further, largely due to a tacit understanding by 
both nations that it was not in their best interests to do so (Greece because she was faced with a fait 
accompli and Turkey because she had gained her immediate objectives with overwhelming military force). 
6 
14c ). The result is that not only do Turkey and Europe not see themselves as traditional 
power competitors, but that they see themselves as allies in a prisoners' dilemma. 
Levels of analysis have also evolved significantly Hans Morgenthau 
simplistically described "power" in terms of eight defining characteristics or Kenneth 
Waltz thought of international relations interaction being based solely on a Holy Grail 
search for security. 14 Several modern realists seem to understand the issues in more 
relative terms. For Samuel Huntington, conflict is about hegemonic economics and 
cultural groupings. 15 For Christopher Layne, it is about minimal realism-an economic 
realpolitik. 16 And for William C. Wohlforth, it is about levels of analysis-the politicians, 
the state and the international system. 17 Extracting key points from these noted 
international relations theorists enables one to conduct an inquiry that is thorough and 
unbiased towards the EU, WEU and Turkish entrance as a full member to these 
organizations. 
Based on modern realist literature, this thesis examines the laggard pace of 
Turkish integration from the three primary realist perspectives named above. This ensures 
that no significant interaction point between Europe and Turkey concerning economic, 
14 Morgenthau as cited in Richard N. Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and 
the Failure of Realism", International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, (New York, 1995), 
p. 28. The eight characteristics are: size, population, natural resources, industrial capacity, military 
preparedness, national character, morale and the quality of diplomacy and government. Waltz from 
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959). 
15 Samuel Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," from The Cold War and After, pp. 
307-322 and "The Clash of Civilizations," from Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1993). 
16 Christopher Layne, "Less is More", The National Interest, (Spring 1996). 
17 William C. Wohlfarth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," from Michael E. Brown, Sean 
M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International 
Security, (Cambridge, Mass, 1995). 
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political and security union is discounted out ofhand. Additionally, modern realism 
provides a framework for impugning significant trends in the absence of complete 
evidence such as in some aspects of security and cultural analysis. Perhaps the most 
important framework of this analysis will be modeled on the realism ofWilliam C. 
Wohlforth18 which allows one to examine the following three components of modern 
foreign policy decision making: 
1. The international system (international organizations, treaties, agreements, 
protocols, etc., as well as the anarchical component). 
2. The state (its politics, culture, economics, etc.). 
3. The leaders (whose decisions ultimately influence and determine domestic 
and foreign policy, sometimes irrespective of"common sense"). 
b. Assumptions and Sources 
Primary sources for this thesis include citings from Lex.is/N ex.is, FBIS and 
Internet search engines with Boolean search phrases. 19 These searches yielded 
approximately 2500 pages of articles with significant references to at least one polity as it 
pertains to the other. A limitation of electronic media sources is that the greatest density 
of this information dates from less than five years ago although there are references which 
are older, especially treaties, significant agreements and protocols, constitutions and major 
policy speeches and decisions. A basic assumption of this thesis, then, is that electronic 
media sources, even though generally limited to the past five years, provide a legitimate 
basis for identifying and discussing the reasons behind Turkey's slow progress towards 
EU and WEU membership when they are combined with more scholarly studies. Other 
18 Ibid. 
19 The core search phases were "Turkey and Elf' and "Turkey and WEU." Due to the extremely 
large amount of information on electronic sources, limiters also had to be used for specific areas. 
Example include "Turkey and EU and Black Sea" and "Turkey and WEU and Gulf War," etc. 
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sources used include books on Turkey, on Europe and on European Institutions. Also 
used were feature-length articles as well as some references on parallel topics such as 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. 20 Additionally, polling 
data from the Index to International Public Opiniorr1 was used to examine issues of 
cultural bias ofEuropeans towards Turkey. 
C. EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY INSTITUTIONS 
There is a number ofEuropean political and military institutions which are 
important to Turkey. Primary among these are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), North Atlantic cooperation Council (NACC), Organization on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE--formerly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe--CSCE), the EU, the WEU and the Council ofEurope (CofE or CE)22• The first 
three of these organizations are NATO-related and are important to Turkey as a 
manifestation of her membership in the Western club as well as for the security guarantees 
they extend to her. 
The other three polities are "purely European"; of the three, the EU and WEU 
interact most often with the United States. The WEU as the "European pillar" ofNATO 
shares an especially close relationship which is still developing. 23 Currently the EU does 
20 Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, after 
1990). Although this book only deals peripherally with Turkey, the analysis it provides of Greek, Spanish 
and Portuguese entrance to the EU is a useful framework for understanding Turkey's situation less the 
cultural impact of Islam. 
21 Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings, editors, Index to International Public 
Opinion, various years 1987 to 1993, (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press). 
22 Turkey is a full member of all but the EU and WEU. A complete list of intematinal 
organizations of which Turkey is member is included in Appendix A. 
23 The WEU's origins are with the 1948 Brussels Treaty. It 1954 it was refounded in its modem 
form with the signing of the Paris Agreements. During most of the Cold War it was not a major military 
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not have a security component, but as the largest economic organization in the world, EU 
policies carry significant foreign policy clout as well. Additionally, under Maastricht, there 
is a provision for the EU to develop a CFSP as its "second pillar." One possibility is that 
WEU would become the basis for this when the founding Brussels Treaty of 1948 comes 
up for review in 1998. The CofE, while significant as a political statement, is not 
particularly powerful in deed. Additionally, Turkey already has what she wants from this 
organization--full membership since its 1949 founding (although she was temporarily 
expelled following the 1980 military coup). 24 
Lack of full membership in the EU and WEU remains sore points for Turkey. In 
the EU, Turkey has only associate member status including Customs Union (CU) (to be 
addressed later) and in the WEU, she is also an associate member. In both organizations, 
associate status places limits on Turkish voice and influence in Europe as well as at home 
and among her neighboring states--most notably the right to vote on issues deemed 
important to her. Turkey's relationship with the WEU is perhaps the more difficult to 
understand due to implied constraints concerning the WEU.25 For example, all WEU 
or political player until 1984 when European interests in creating and strengthening an European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) as part NATO's European pillar were reawakened. The move to a 
greater integrated European security identity was further enhanced in 1987 with the Foreign and Defense 
Ministers of the member countries development of a platform outlining the WEU's role within NATO and 
Europe. During the European Council meeting at Maastrict in 1991, it was further decided to enhance the 
WEU by expanding it, defining its role as the future arm of an integrated ESDI and further clarifying its 
relationship with NATO culminating with the 19 June 1992 Petersberg Declaration when these goals (all 
of which are being reviewed as part of the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) and which were 
officially sanctioned by the January 1994 NATO Summit meeting). NATO Handbook, (Brussels, 1995), 
pp. 196-203. 
24 
Greece was expelled in 1967 for the same reason, Lawrence Whitehead in "International 
Aspects of Democratization," from O'Donnell, p. 20. 
25 
The EU and WEU are two completely separate organizations despite a lay misperception that 
the WEU is subordinate to the EU. Under Maastricht, there is a provision for the EU to eventually 
develop a common foreign and security policy and it is possible that the basis for this would be the present 
WEU (the WEU Treaty is up for review in 1998). This is, however, not stated anywhere formally and no 
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member nations are also NATO members and EU members. This is not meant to imply 
that membership in the EU and NATO provides automatic admission to the WEU, rather 
it shows a convergence of interests that seems to be self justifying although unintentional 
at first. 26 • Turkey's hope appears to be that full membership in these two organizations 
will increase domestic and international prestige, better position her economically and 
deepen her western security guarantees. 27 
D. HISTORY OF EUROPEAN-TURKISH RELATIONS 
To better understand modern Turkish-European relations and the roots of some 
modern prejudices from both a European and Turkish viewpoint, a look at their mutual 
history is in order. Even today, Turkish-European relations remain somewhat tainted by 
the economic and military competition of a rising and then declining Ottoman Empire vis-
decision is likely until the results of the present IGC are announced in 1997. Additionally, the WEU is 
not nearly as cohesive as NATO and, unlike NATO, it has no organic forces of its own although units 
such as the European Corps (in which Germany, France, Spain, Luxembourg and Belgium participate), 
NATO multinational division central (in which Belgium, Britain, the Netherlands and Germany 
participate) and the UK-Netherlands amphibious force are Forces Available to the Western European 
Union (FA WEU). From Mathias Jopp, "The Strategic Implications of European Integration," Adelphi 
Paper 290, (London: Brassey's Ltd. for The International Institute for Stategic Studies, July 1994), p. 28. 
This article also provides an in-depth overview of the all major issues related to the EU, WEU and their 
respective enlargements. 
26 Rationalization began as the outgrowth of the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis and was formalized by 
the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 and the Kirchberg Declaration of9 May 1994. From the 
NATO Handbook. It is interesting to note that several of the former East Bloc states want EU membership 
because with it they believe that they would have a better chance at gaining admission to the WEU. 
Membership in the WEU would mean de facto NATO membership since the interrelatedness of the 
Atlantic Treaty and the WEU Treaty effectively extends the military gaurantees of one organization to the 
other. More significantly, WEU mutual defense guarantees under its Article 5 are more strongly stated 
than NATO's Article 5 (for the wording of Article 5 garantees, see footnote 107). 
27Turkey's percieved threats have changed greatly since the end of the Cold War and Russia is no 
longer the all encompassing enemy she was. Current primary security issues include international 
terrorism, riparian rights issues with Syria and Iraq, and problems in the Caucasus especially with 
Armenia and the threatened development and employment of weapons of mass destruction by Iran, Iraq 
and Syria. Evidence of European and NATO recognition of Turkish security issues along her southern 
border are obvious when one looks at a map delineating forces under CFE. On such a map, a line runs 
roughly through the east-west axis of Turkey. Forces to the north of this line fall under CFE guidelines, 
those to the south do not. 
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a-vis the West European states during the last 400 years. In the European mind is the 
memory ofthe Ottoman invasions ofEurope which were finally ended with Sultan 
Mustafa II' s defeat at the gates of Vienna in 1683.28 As well, they recall that this was not 
merely a war of expansion, but also a war between different civilizations. Had Sultan 
Mustafa II won, it is very likely that European civilization as it exists today would have 
been radically different despite relatively high Ottoman tolerance for other religions and 
cultures. 29 
From a Turkish viewpoint, they remember the rather shabby treatment they 
received at European hands, especially economic, as the "sick man ofEurope" during the 
19th and early 20th centuries. 30 Even today, a significant minority of Turks still fears 
European economic domination without benefit to them, especially since this minority 
perceives it as the advance wedge of westernization that will ultimately override that 
28 Vienna was unsuccessfully besieged in 1529 by Stileyman the Magnificent who did succeed in 
capturing European territory as far as Belgrade (1521) and Budapest (1526). His successors subsequently 
captured Crete and territory in the Ukraine and threatened Vienna again in 1664 before being defeated by 
King Sobieski of Poland in 1683 outside Vienna. From Helen Chapin Metz, Turkey: A Country Study. 
(Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, US Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 20-22. 
29 A dynamic historical novel covering a portion of the Ottoman invasions and their interaction 
with European culture on the Balkan peninsula is the Nobel Prize for Literature winner The Bridge on the 
River Drina by lvo Andric (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1977). This book indicates that tolerance 
was a product of a static empire. During the expansionistic phase, the Ottomans aggressively encouraged 
the conversion of Christians to Islam through multiple forms of coercion such as economic sanctions and 
withholding of political office. Children, as part of treaty arrangements on tribute, were also kidnapped to 
serve the Sultan and part of their new life included conversion to Islam. The Ottoman legacy in this 
region remains extremely important even today as the EU and WEU grapple with the Yugoslav crisis 
which, although attibutable to many factors in Balkan history to include the effects of the Russian and 
Habsburg Empires, has also been exacerbated by the religious schism begun in Ottoman times. An 
excellent historical text on the minorities in the Ottoman era is Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey. A Modern 
History, (New York: LB. Tauris, 1994), pp. 11-172. 
30 It was Czar Nicholas I who first used this phrase with respect to the "Eastern question" as a 
description of how the European powers should divide up Ottoman territory so that none ofthem gained a 
decisive advantage in territory, population and wealth which would upset the balance of power in the 19th 
century. 
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which gives the Turk his national character--perhaps most importantly his religion, but 
also their very distinct and proud history. 31 
The early 20th century was a difficult time for what became modern-day Turkey as 
Europeans (Germany) pulled the Ottoman Empire into the First World War and other 
Europeans (the Allies) invaded her as the beginning of the end of the Ottomans. By war's 
end an exhausted Ottoman Empire expected to be completely broken up for its place on 
the losing side as well as for the atrocities and suffering it instigated on the Armenians. 32 
Were it not for the efforts of the Turkish Nationalists led by Pasha Kemal Atatiirk in 1919, 
the allied-sanctioned Greek invasion of modern-day Turkey might have succeeded in 
destroying even the Ottoman rump.33 Instead, Turkish victory over the Greeks set up the 
conditions for the signing of the Treaty ofLausanne in which Turkey was the only 
defeated World War I power to participate as an equal to the victors. 34 
In the years between the two world wars, Turkish-European relations consisted 
primarily of normalization of relations, while Turkey under Atatiirk aggressively recreated 
31 The primary group who feels this way are the fundamentally oriented Welfare Party and its 
adherents who won the greatest percentage of votes in the 24 December 1995 election (21.3%--Sami 
Kohen, "Islamic Party Win Worsens Turkey's East vs. West Woes," The Christian Science Monitor, (27 
December 1995). Obviously 21 percent is not a mandate or a consensus and, as is usual in Turkish 
politics, is not nearly so clear as politicians might make it appear since politicians often say something 
other than one they believe in order to garner support. Graham E. Fuller hints at this in Turkey's New 
Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China by Graham E. Fuller and Ian 0. Lesser, (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), p. 171. An Asahi New Service article, "Don't Jump To Conclusions 
on Effect of Turkish Vote," from Lexis/Nexis (27 December 1995) states "what Turkish voters supported 
may have been not so much its fundamentalist tone, but its low-profile welfare efforts." Indeed it is the 
disenfranchised and disillusioned who are not recipients of any economic trickle-down effect who are 
most against closer ties to the west and the European Union as stated by Ertugrul Klirk<;li in "The Crisis 
of the Turkish State," from Middle East Report, (Spring 1996), pp. 2-4. 
32 Metz, p. 30-31. Estimates of Armenian dead vary from 600,000 to over 1,000,000 with both 
Turks and Kurds carrying out the massacres. 
33 Metz, p. 34. 
34 Metz, p. 35. 
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herself as a secular state using the west as a model while simultaneously trying to avoid 
the international entanglements which ultimately brought almost all ofEurope to war by 
1941. During World War II, Turkey managed to keep herself neutral, scrupulously 
enforcing the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits although she did sign pacts 
with both Allied and Axis powers. Finally, in February 1945, she declared war on 
Germany as a precondition for joining the future United Nations (UN). 35 
After World War II, Turkish ties to the United States and Europe strengthened as 
Russia began to restate old claims against Turkish territory, particularly in the Turkish 
Straits as part of a broader strategy of improving her access to the Mediterranean and 
Black Sea. Soviet aggressive policy had the result of causing the United Stated to put 
forth the Truman Doctrine which guaranteed the security ofTurkey and Greece (1947). 
In 1950, Turkey sent an infantry brigade to Korea which greatly enhanced her bid for full 
NATO membership which was granted simultaneously to Greece and Turkey in 1952 and 
which served to unequivocally bring Turkey into the European orbit. 
Turkey's formal relations with the EU began on 31 July 1959 when she applied for 
European Economic Community (EEC) membership. Associate member status was 
quickly granted on 11 September of the same year. 36 On 12 September 1963, Turkey 
signed the "Ankara Agreement" which was to take Turkey into Customs Union (CU) and 
ultimately to full EEC membership but no time line was given. Customs Union finally 
35 
Metx, p. 40. Other nations neutral which declared war in the last days of the World War II 
include Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland as well as many South American nations. 
36 
As a point of comparison, Greece applied 8 June, 1959 and was granted full EU membership on 
1 January 1981. "Turkey-EU Relations Calendar," http://www.turkey.or/news/ 0216po17.htrn (29 May 
1996) and "Chronology of the Union," http://www.cec.lu/ enlchronlchron.htrnl (21 May 1996). 
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happened on 1 January 1996, but EU membership languishes as the EU looks to Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) for its new members rather than deal with the economic, 
political, foreign policy and humanitarian issues Turkish EU membership would engender. 
In April 1987, Turkey applied for membership in the Western European Union 
and, as in the case with EU membership, it appeared no significant progress would be 
made for the foreseeable future. 37 The status quo might have continued had there not been 
a rationalization ofWEU membership in 1991 which allowed NATO members who were 
not EU members to become Associate Members of the WEU as part of the means to 
"reinforce the 'European Pillar of the Alliance' ."38 This means that Turkey is allowed to 
participate in WEU issues and operations unless "a majority of the Full Members decides 
otherwise. "39 Turkey does not agree with the principle of Associate Member status 
because she believes that there is not a legal basis for it in the 1948 Brussels Treaty, but as 
an outsider, she has little choice but to voice objections and make do.40 
One European organization in which Turkey has had full membership for an 
extended period of time is the Council ofEurope of which Turkey was a founding member 
in 1949.41 This organization whose goal is the promotion of democracy, stability and 
human rights among its member nations has had a tumultuous relationship with Turkey 
37 
"European Security and Defense Identity and Turkey," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/secure.htm (as of 18 November 1996). 
38 Ibid. The other Associate Members of the WEU include Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway. 
39
"Western European Union: Membership," http://www.fco.gov.uk/ weulmembership.htrnl (as of 
21 May 1996). 
40
"European Security and Defense .... " Mathias Jopp, "The Strategic Implications ofEuropean 
Integration," Adelphi Paper 290, (London: Brassey's Ltd. for The International Institute for Stategic 
Studies, July 1994), p. 28, also says Associate Member status does not have a treaty basis although he does 
not specifically refer to Turkey in this context. 
41 Metz, p. xxxii and World, p. 489. 
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having observed three Turkish military coups ( 1960, 1971 and 1980) for which Turkish 
membership was suspended in 1982.42 Nonetheless, Turkey's leaders continue to affirm 
the goals of the CotE, to encourage its use as a dialogue forum, especially for international 
terrorism issues, and to support its enlargement to the nations surrounding Turkey 
(apparently including even Russia). 43 Turkey's latest success towards European 
integration is the much-hailed Customs Union (CU) of 1 January 1996 for which Turkey 
received congratulations from all major European powers plus the United States. 44 Other 
major European oriented organizations of which Turkey is a member include the 
Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CotE 
or CE), and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).45 
E. THE ISSUES 
It is an unfortunately true cliche that Turkey indeed "lives in a rough 
neighborhood."46 It is also geopolitically true that, as Dean Acheson is alleged to have 
said, "Turkey doesn't cover much, but what she does cover is absolutely vital." Hence, as 
much as Europe would prefer to distance herself from Turkey's foreign policy problems, 
Europeans also understand that they cannot afford to abrogate their interests and access to 
42 Metz, p. 256. 
43 
"Turkey in the Council of Europe," from Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage, http://www. 
mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/mfa471.htm (as of 18 May 1996). 
44 
"Customs Union Vote Anchors Turkey in the West", Turkey Today, (No. 153, 
November/December 1995), p. 1; and "Congratulations," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage, 
http://www.turkey.org/ news/0216po18.htm, (29 May 1996). Congratulations were sent by President 
Jacques Chirac of France, US State Department Spokesman Gwyn Davies, German Foreign Minister 
Klaus Kinkel, and British Prime Minister John Major. 
45 
For a complete list of organizations of which Turkey is a member, see Appendix A. 
46 
Thomas Friedman, in "Pay Attention as Turkey Seeks Its Way in a Rough Neighborhood," 
International Herald Tribune from Lexis/Nexis (18 May 1996) also refers to Turkey as being in a "bad 
neighborhood." 
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the areas surrounding Turkey. Likewise for Turkey continued contact with Europe is 
vital. Not only is Europe by far Turkey's largest trading partner, but she is the only major 
geopolitical area that does not represent a military threat to Turks. 47 For reasons of 
economic and strategic necessity, then, Turkey and Europe must maintain close contact 
with one another, the question is to what degree. 
The issues surrounding the pros and cons of Turkish membership in the EU can be 
broken down to four major points: (I) differences in religion and culture; 
(2)governmental--perceived weaknesses in Turkey's democratic tradition, application of 
the rule of law and adherence to human rights accords, especially with respect to the 
Kurds; (3) CFSP concerns, particularly poor Greek-Turkish relations; (4) economic 
concerns over competitiveness and population growth as well as access to other markets. 48 
1. Differences in Religion and Culture 
The original premise of this thesis was that prejudice due to differences in Turkish 
and European cultures on the model of Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" was the 
primary factor preventing Turkish entrance into the EU and WEU. Research, however, 
has failed to support this view. In thousands of pages of news releases and analysis, no 
main-stream European leader has publicly indicated any cultural bias against the Turks as 
47 Turkey conducts over 50% of her foreign trade with Europe with the Middle East being second 
in importance. Oni~, p. 56. 
48 Miikerrem Hi~, Turkey's Customs Union with the European Union, sponsored by Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, (Ebenhausen, Germany: September 1995) contains a brief analysis of all but 
the cultural and population growth aspects. 
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grounds for non-admission of Turkey into either the EU or WEU and only one key 
Turkish leader has--and he is on the far right of the Turkish political spectrum. 49 
There is, however, evidence to suggest that average Europeans have a poor 
opinion of Turks and are generally unfavorable to Turkish accession to the EU. In a poll 
conducted in 1990, EU citizens almost universally gave Turks the lowest "trust" rating of 
25 nationalities including countries in the EU, CEE, Asia and North America (Appendix 
B, Table 16). When EU citizens were asked in 1992 "which countries do you think should 
be part of the European Community in the year 2000?" Turkey did much better--turning in 
roughly the same performance figures as the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Estonia, doing 
somewhat better than Russia or Slovakia and somewhat worse than Poland, Malta and 
Hungary (Appendix B, Table 17). However in a much less comprehensive poll done in 
1993, Turkey finished at the bottom of a list of nations considered for EU membership "in 
the near future" (Appendix B, Table 18).50 These public opinion figures suggest that 
European political leaders have to at least consider the generally negative attitude of their 
constituencies. Hence cultural bias, while not a reason for non-admission, at best provides 
little incentive to push for Turkish accession. 
By far the most prominent Turkish leader who believes in the separateness of 
Turkish and European cultures is Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Welfare Party and 
current Turkish Prime Minister. When talking of the latest EU-Turkish success, the CU, 
49 
When Necmettin Erbakan, current Turkish Prime Minister and leader of the Islamist "Welfare 
Party" was in the opposition, his party attacked the EU as a "Christian Club." From John Barham, "Set 
on the East-West Divide," Financial Times Survey, (6 December 1996), p. I. 
50 This list comprised Austria, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Malta, and 
Cypruss. No CEE countries were included. 
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he said, "We shall scrap the customs union with the European Union, which is a document 
of surrender and shame for Turkey."51 But even he, when faced with the reality of 
increased responsibility as Prime Minister and the need to work within a coalition to 
maintain power, later back pedaled on this strong remark and in a joint statement issued 
with Tansu Ciller (the minority coalition party leader) said, "Policies that will encourage 
new employment opportunities, that will support small and medium-size installations, that 
will contribute to the development of developing regions, and that will ensure adjustment 
to the competition necessitated by the Customs Union will be implemented."52 It is very 
important for both Europeans and the Turkish elite to remember that many Turks 
(especially the poor and less educated) appear to see modern-day secularization as one 
having, at best, only minimal benefits for them: "The conservatives in the center-right 
parties saw in secularism an ideology that undermined family and community ties, and led 
to the moral degeneration of youth, the weakening of spiritual values, and the spread of 
communism among alienated intellectuals--social ills that could only be cured by 
religion. "53 
There is another issue dealing with cultural identification which is unstated by all 
but the European ultra right and the extreme right and left of Turkey that can be thought 
of in terms of the question: Is Turkey a part ofWestern tradition or Eastern tradition?54 
51 Sami Kohen, "Islamic Party Win Worsens Turkey's East vs. West Woes," The Christian 
Science Monitor (27 December 1995). 
52 
"Turkey: Erbakan, Ciller News Conference on Coalition," Ankara TRT Television Network, 
translation by FBIS, (29 June 1996, 0816 GMT). Equally important is that in over six months as Prime 
Minister, his government has "done nothing to sever ties with the west or scrap the customs union." From 
Barham, p. I. 
53 Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization oflslam in Turkey," Middle 
East Journal, (Volume 50, Number 1, Winter 1996), p. 44. 
54 Mauther, p. IV. 
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The answer, if one definitively knew it to be "yes" or "no" would make the question ofEU 
and WEU membership much easier to deal with since there would probably be a clear 
consensus by everyone involved of Turkey's eventual status. 55 Instead the answer is 
ambiguous and perhaps was best expressed by Turkey's former Foreign Minister Mesut 
Yilmaz when he said: "Europe is a state of mind, not an arbitrary line drawn down the 
Bosporus"56 
Little did he know he actually may have spoken the mind of many ofEurope's 
leaders as well as that of the Turkish elite's. European politicians seem to believe in their 
heart of hearts that Turkey does not belong in the European "state of mind," at least when 
it comes down to taking a strong position in favor of Turkish admission.57 Obviously no 
one wants to alienate a key ally and friendly nation so they cannot publicly say they do not 
want Turkey in the EU and WEU. Instead they must rely on "rationality" to determine 
55 In a public opinion poll conducted in Great Britain in November 1992, 46% of respondents 
said Turkey was part of Asia, 31% that Turkey was European and 23% did not know. (Appendix B, Table 
11). 
56 Ian 0. Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War" in Turkey's New 
Geopolitics by Graham E. Fuller and Ian 0. Lesser, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993), p. 105. 57 In my research, I have found no mainstream European politician who has publicly stated 
reserve to Turkish admission to the EU based on a prejudicial attitute towards Turkey. Nonetheless I 
believe there is an element of reserve which while be no means primary or even sufficient to preclude 
Turkish entrance to the EU and WEU, is a complicating factor. Samual Huntington in "The Clash of 
Civilizations" certainly believes (perhaps overstates the case) that cultural seperateness is important. 
Robert Mauther, a Diplomatic Correspondent with the EEC in "Misunderstandings Persist," Financial 
Times Survey from Lexis/Nexis (20 May 1985), p. IV voices the issues of Turkish "incompatibility" as 
perhaps being more important than the generally given rational explanations for the slow progress of 
Turkish accession to the EU and WEU. Other articles from the Financial Times that very broadly hint at 
a sense of cultural seperateness being a factor in Turkish accession include: John Wyles, "Relations with 
the EEC Soured by Human Right Issue," Financial Times Survey from Lexis/Nexis, (17 May 1983), 
Section IV, p. III; and Leslie Colitt, "Bitter Times for Workers Abroad," from Lexis/Nexis, Financial 
Times Survey, (17 May 1982), Section III, p. X. Note, though, that these three articles were written in the 
period of rapprochement following the 1980 Turkish military coup. Thomas L. Friedman in "Pay 
Attention as Turkey Seeks Its Way in a Rough Neighborhood," International Herald Tribune, (18 May 
1995), is much stronger on the issue of European bias saying, "Many members of the European 
Parliament [sic] despise the Turks because they are Muslims .... " 
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admission (or non-admission) of Turkey into the ranks of the EU and WEU. 58 Turkish 
leaders in the foreign ministry, at least, believe this as shown in a press release that said, in 
part, "It is well known that various quarters in Europe have been alarmed at Turkey's 
entry into a customs union with the European Union and its subsequent aim ofbecoming a 
full EU member. These objections of these circles are ultimately based on a racist 
approach linked to the fact that Turkey possesses a different culture and religion. But 
(sic] they are unable to say this openly .... "59 A European writer in 1984, even before 
Turkey had submitted her formal application for membership in the EEC, states "The 
general view in Brussels, [sic] is that it would be better for everyone if Turkey maintained 
a proper regard for the Community but was a little less in love with the idea of belonging 
to it. " 60 In the near term, it appears to make little difference what Turkey wants since 
Greece steadfastly maintains a veto on packages beneficial to Turkey to include Turkish 
EU membership (a condition ofWEU membership). 61 If a proposal for majority voting 
instead of consensus voting is ratified, a topic to be addressed at the current IGC, then it is 
possible that all ofEurope will have to grapple with the issue of :full admission ofTurkey 
without relying on a simple solution in a Greek veto.62 
58 Mauther, Section III, p. IV. It is important to note that Mauther was writing before the end of 
the Cold War and that some of his assumptions concerning Turkish-European relations are no longer 
valid such as that Turkey and Europe must remain friendly due to the constraints of bipolar world. 
59 
"Photographs and Article Published in The European Newspaper," Turkish Foreign Ministry 
homepage on the Internet at http:www//mfa.gov.tr/GRUPH/Release/O.htm, (12 January 1996). 
60 John Wyles, "Relations with the EEC Soured by Human Right Issue," Financial Times Survey 
from Lexis/Nexis, (17 May 1983), Section IV, p. III. 
61 
"Turkey: Foreign Minister Views Greek Impact on Ties with EU," Ankara Turkish Daily 
News in English from FBIS (26 June 1996); "Greece: Politicians React to Turkey's Claims on Island," 
Athens News in English from FBIS, (6 June 1996), p. 3; and "Turkey: Yilmaz 'Fails' to Change Greek, 
EU Positions, Ankara Turkish Daily News in English, from FBIS, (26 March 1996). 
62 
"Greece: Politicians React ... ," p. 3. Of course it is possible that Greece would vote against 
majority voting just for this reason. 
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2. Democratic Tradition, Rule of Law and Human Rights 
a. Democratic Tradition 
Turkey's democratic tradition is based on the legacy left by her republican 
founding father, Pasha Kemal Atatiirk. Today, his pro-western reforms serve as 
justification for calls for security and especially economic union of Turkey with the EU. 
To the religiously-oriented Turkish minority, however, movement westwards is the 
continuation of a negative secularization trend which began with increasing Western 
influence in the Ottoman Empire, brought about Ottoman destruction by the Western allies 
in the wake ofWorld War I and which continues to haunt the modem Turkish state since 
its 1923 founding. 63 This is not a denunciation of Atatiirk' s legacy (almost universally 
Turks see him as a national hero to whom Turkey owes its modem existence); rather, 
they are uncomfortable with the numerous reforms begun by him and continued by his 
successors under the tutelage of the military. Further, there seems to be a duality to 
Turkish adherence to Kemalism and the contradictions Turkish society has with the legacy 
of its founder. The most extreme example ofthis duality derives from a study ofWelfare 
Party voters which showed that "41% ofthose who voted for the Islamist Welfare (Refah) 
Party (RP) declared themselves laik (secular) which is a Kemalist identification.64 
Europeans may ask why this question of Atatiirk is important, but it is highly 
telling to remember that even 70 years after Atatiirk, some goals ofhis modernization 
63 Celestine Bohlen, "Few Countries Honor Their Gods the Way Turkey Reveres Mustafa Kemal 
Atatiirk," New York Times, (May 1996). 
64 Sami Zubaida, "Turkish Islam and National Identity," Middle East Report, (Spring 1996), p. 
10, as taken from Ferhat Kentel, "L'Islam, carrefour des identites sociales et culturelles en Turquie: Le 
cas de Parti de la Prosperite," Cahiers d'etudes sur la Mediteranee orientale et le monde turco-iranien, (CEMOTI) 19 (Jan-Jun 1995), pp. 211-227. 
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program have not yet been achieved--most notably in the economic arena. (For more on 
Atatiirk's reforms see Chapter VI, part Bon Kemalism). That Europeans believe this is 
shown by a 1989 poll which showed that only 13% ofEuropeans in 1989 thought "Turkey 
is a modem country" while 67% said it was not. 65 There remains in Turkey a significant 
minority of citizens who do not feel that westernization has conveyed the economic 
advantages they expected as well . The recent example of the Welfare Party's success 
with the largest percentage of the vote in the 24 December 1995 elections at 21.4%66 is 
seen by many analysts as a result of economic disenfranchisement as much as a vote for a 
more Islamic Turkey. 67 In one study by TUSIAD (Turkish Businessman's and 
Industrialist's Association), " ... in 1989 the richest 20% of Turkish society controlled 
60% of the national income while the poorest 20 percent controlled only 4 percent."68 
Welfare victory by no means represents an Islamist mandate and also owes a 
significant amount to the competition for centrist votes by Turkey's more moderate 
parties. Using figures from the table below shows that "centrist" parties (center left, 
center, and center right) earned 68% of the vote with the remainder split strongly to the 
right. 
65 See Appendix B, Table Bl4a. Note this figure is probably based on ignorance rather than 
knowledge as indicated by the relatively low number of people responding that they "know Turks," (Table 
Bl4f). Another telling figure would be the number of Europeans who have actually visited Turkey which 
this author suspects is under 30 percent. 
66Celestine Bohlen, "Islamic Party in Turkey Is Asked to Form Coalition," The New York Times 
International, (10 January 1996), p. A6. . 
67 Examples include Ertugrul Klirk~li, "The Crisis of the Turkish State," Middle East Report, 
(Spring 1996); Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization oflslam in Turkey," 
Middle East Report (Winter, 1996), p. 53. 
68 K .. k .. 7 ur ~u, p .. 
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Table 1: Turkeys Political parties as of 24 December 199569 
**round-off error of 1% 
Nonetheless, there is some unease with creating Atatiirk's secular western-style 
nation out of Islamic roots (although even the anti-securlarists are alleged to regard 
Atatiirk "as the first among the great men of all time, even before the Prophet. "r0 An 
early example ofthe Turkish unease with secularization is seen in the first free Turkish 
election (1950) when the winner was President Menderes who ran on a platform 
promising greater privatization of industry and religious tolerance. 71 A Financial Times 
69 Data for this table is taken from Mark Rosenshield, "Turkey's Major Political Parties," Middle 
East Report, (April-June 1996), p. 4. Note that Rosenshield's article states the Welfare Party won 28.73 
percent of the vote. This, however, appears to be a typographical error, otherwise the total for the"% Dec 
Vote"· column would be 108 percent. Figures for the outcome of the election do vary from source to 
source. Metz, on page xxxviii, for example, says that the Motherland Party won 19.6 percent versus 
Rosenshield's 24%. This is apparantly due to when various authors obtained the percentages for their 
articles. 
70 Sami Zubaida, "Turkish Islam and National Identity," Middle East Report, (Spring, 1996), p. 
10. 
71 Metz, p. 4. Eventually the military came to believe that his reforms were in contradiction to 
their image ofKemalism and he was disposed by them in a coup in 1960. 
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Survey on Turkey states, "It is not often appreciated that this is one ofthe great mosque 
building periods in Turkish history and that one child in eight in secondary education is 
attending a religious school."72 Eventually Menderes' policies were perceived as such a 
threat to Turkish secularization ("Kemalism"), that the military, who even today see 
themselves as the guarantors of Atatiirk' s reforms, 73 overthrew his government in 1960--
only 1 0 years after democratic elections were allowed. 74 Since then there have been two 
other military takeovers, in 1971 and again in 1980. The 1980 coup was particularly 
troubling to Europeans since Turkey was already working closely with European 
institutions and it was thought as part of its drive towards EEC and WEU full membership 
to be adhering to a policy of legal power turnovers. 
b. Human Rights, the Rule of Law and the Kurds 
The Kurdish problem symbolizes to many Europeans the problems Turkey 
has with respect to human rights and the rule oflaw. Although human rights violations 
are probably overstated in much of the European press (the article which first appeared in 
The European ( 11-17 January 1996) with gruesome pictures of alleged Turkish special 
forces soldiers posing with the severed heads of alleged PKK members is probably the 
most extreme example), there are grounds for concern. The real problem, though, is 
trying to assign ultimate culpability for the violence which originated in Kurdish-populated 
72 David Tonge, "Moving Cautiously Towards Reform," Financial Times Survey from 
Lexis/Nexis, (14 May 1985), p. 1. 
73 A significant aspect of "Kemalism" is the very important role played by the military in 
maintaining Turkey's secular path. Heinz Kramer, Die Ttirkei als Regionalmacht. Brticke und Modell, 
(Ebenhausen, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 1995), p. 35; Feroz Ahmad. The 
Making of Modem Turkey, (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 1-14. 
74 Metz, p. 4. Europeans were not only upset by the military coup which overthrew Mr. 
Menderes, but also that he was hanged for his "crimes." This is perhaps hypocritical considering World 
War II, with its atrocities which Turkey managed to avoid, started only twenty years earlier. 
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regions of Anatolia and have since spread to Europe as Kurdish terrorist groups carry 
their cause abroad. 75 It is therefore not surprising that even mildly left-of-center 
publications such as Der Spiegel are decidely anti-PKK if not pro-Turkish. 76 
Since the 1980s, the PKK has been waging a high profile terrorist 
campaign both within and without Turkey. The result is, in European eyes, an escalation 
of violence on their territory as well as within Turkey and significant human rights 
violations by Turkey which the European public is unwilling to countenance despite their 
own implications in World War II and its associated atrocities. 77 (For more on the PKK 
and legal issues, see chapter VII, Parts B and C). 
3. CFSP 
The most important aspect of concern to Europeans in the formation of a common 
foreign and security policy with respect to Turkey is the problem of Greek-Turkish 
relations which have been bad for centuries and which need to be solved prior to Turkish 
admission to the EU and WEU, especially since unanimity is required to admit a new 
member. 
75 
Tomas Avenarius, "Ocalan Threatens 'Suicide Attacks' in Turkey, Germany," from Munich 
Siiddeutche Zeitung, translation provided by FBIS, (30 March 1996), p. 9; Stephen Kinzer, "Anti-Turkey 
Kurdish Separatists Blaimed for Attacks Accross Europe," Special to the New York Times, from 
Lexis/Nexis, (5 November 1993), Section A, p. 6; and Hugh Pope, "The Kurds: Why Are They Causing 
Havoc in Europe?" The Independent, from Lexis/Nexis, (27 June 1993), p. 12. 
76 
"Myth of Omnipotence; Two Prosecution Witnesses reveal the Methods of the Proscribed 
Kurd Organization," from Hamburg Der Spiegel in German, translation provided by FBIS, (l April 
1996), pp. 62-69. 
77 
Some Turkish officials believe that Europeans are using Turkey's alleged human rights 
violations with respect to the Kurds as an excuse to keep Turkey out of the EU and WEU. See 
"Photographs and Article Published in The European Newspaper," Turkish Foreign Ministry Press 
Release, Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage on the Internet at http:www//mfa.gov.tr/GRUPH/ 
Release/O.htm, (12 January 1996). 
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Greek-Turkish animosity primarily concerns protection of their respective ethnic 
groups on Cyprus and territorial rights to certain Mediterranean islands and the waters and 
airspace surrounding them. 78 The difficulty for Europe is that Greece is willing to use her 
membership in any of the pan-European organizations in which she is a member (NATO, 
the EU, the WEU, CotE, and OSCE), and especially the EU and WEU, ~gainst Turkey 
whenever possible, and that Europe has proven ineffective at handling Greek-Turkish 
disputes without United States help. 79 Naturally, Greek-Turkish tension affects the 
smooth functioning of all these organizations and could theoretically call into question the 
viability of any or all of the above organizations were Greece and Turkey to actually go to 
war. 80 In the case of the EU and WEU, many Europeans fear full membership by both 
Turkey and Greece would amount to Europeans assuming responsibility for solving 
disputes between the two countries. The recent Imia/Kardak Islets dispute is a case in 
point; Europe attempted to intervene, but proved unable. It was only with United States 
intervention that conflict on a wider scale was avoided. 81 (For more on this, see chapter 
VII, Part A.2). 
Another CFSP-related concern Europeans have over extending their border 
southeastward parallels the Greek-Turkish issue--Europeans would rather have the United 
78 Metz, pp. 53-56. 
79 William Drozdiak, "Europe's Dallying Amid Crisis Scares Its Critics," International Herald 
Tribune, (8 February 1996), p. 6. 
80 NATO withstood this test when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and was highly influential in 
ending the conflict as well as keeping it "contained." 
81 Philip H. Gordon, "America, the White Knight Should Stop Humiliating Europe," 
International Herald Tribune, (17-18 February 1996), p. 6; "Deputies Fault EU's Handling of Aegean 
Turmoil," International Herald Tribune, (16 February 1996), p. 5; and "Cyprus: Kliridhis Questions EU 
as Security Guarantor," Nicosia 0 Agon, in Greek, translation by FBIS, (5 Feb 1996), p. 5; Henze in 
Fuller, pp. 8-11. 
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States available to take the lead rather than putting themselves in a situation where 
Americans might expect them to intercede on Turkey's behalf were there a major problem 
with one of Turkey's non-Greek neighbors (Syria, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and Georgia). 82 In 
the present security arrangement, this is not a major problem since the only real security 
guarantees Europeans have vis-a-vis with Turkey are through NATO--which implies 
United States involvement were there a problem such as the recent Second GulfWar. 
4. Economic Competitiveness and Population Growth 
a. Economic Competitiveness 
Europeans perceive the Turkish economy as problematic but with 
potential. 83 It is often called centrally organized, restrictive of foreign-owned businesses, 
not-competitively organized, corrupt and undisciplined. Further, it suffers from high 
inflation, low infrastructure investment and too much government control. 84 On the up-
side, economic analysts have been predicting doom for Turkey for years: "Yet the 
country's resilience is almost miraculous, muddling through the most daunting 
problems. "85 Further, foreign investors see the worth in Turkey as shown by most of the 
world's multi-nationals having a presence there with ongoing plans by Asians and 
Europeans to continue investing in what they believe is an under-penetrated market. 86 
82 Lesser, in Fuller, pp. 104, 115 
83 
Marie-Grance Calle, "Paris Wants to Double Trade with Turkey," Paris Le Figaro-Econornie 
Supplement, in French, translation provided by FBIS, (25 May 1996). "Turkey is a Eurasian Dragon 
which is at or door and within our reach." 
84 Barham, p. I; Hi~, pp. 17-24. 
85 Barham, p. I. 
86 ibid. 
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b. Population Growth 
Turkey's population growth rate is the highest in Europe at 1. 97 percent87 
and the country is expected to have 75 million people by the year 2000.88 In 2009 
Turkey's population will surpass the Germany's if present trends continue. 89 Burgeoning 
population is both a boon and a bane to Europe. On the negative account, it means that 
there will be increasing pressure on European nations by Turkey to accept Turkish 
migrants who are unable to find work at home.90 Additionally, were full EU membership 
granted, there would be no legal restrictions on Turkish workers (or other European 
workers, for that matter), moving abroad to find employment.91 Based on opinion polls of 
EU citizens on questions of Turkish immigrants, it appears that Europeans would not be 
amenable to sizable numbers of new Turkish migrants. 92 Turkey's rapidly growing 
87 World, p. 426. 
88 James Buchan, "Family Planning Still in its Infancy," Financial Times Survey, (17 May 1982), 
Section III, p. XV. 
89 Using figures from World, Turkey with a population growth rate of 1.97% and 63.4 million 
people in 1995 (p. 426) and Germany with a growth rate of0.26% and 81.3 million people in 1995 (p. 
159), Turkey will be more populous than Germany in 2009 with 85.1 million inhabitants to Germany's 
84.5 million. Making the bold assumption that population growth demographics remain constant for an 
even longer term with respect to Russia (149.9 million inhabitants in 1995 with a growth rate of0.2%, 
World, p. 353) shows Turkey's population passing Russia's in 2043 with 165.7 million versus 165.3 · 
million inhabitants. 
90 Leslie Colitt, "Bitter Times for Workers Abroad," Financial Times Survey, (May 17 1982), 
Section III, p. X. In 1982, Turkish workers sent home US $2.85 billion. 
91 The Maastricht Treatv, from the Internet at http://www.cec.lu/en/record/mt/heads.html, 
(adopted 10 December 1991, ratified 1 November 1993). Title II, Article G, Section B, reads "Article 3 
shall be replaced by the following: 
Article 3: For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as 
provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein: 
(c) an internal market characterized by the abolition, as between Member States of obstacles to 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital ... " 
92 See Appendix B, Tables 14e and 14f. When citizens of all twelve European countries were 
asked in 1989 to respond to the statement "Many Turkish Workers live in our country," six out oftwelve--
Austria, Denmark, West Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and SWitzerland--responded with over 90 
percent "agree/yes." The same respondents from these same countries, when asked to respond to "I've 
already gotten to know Turks," had an average "yes/agree" rate of only 56 percent. This suggests one of 
two possibilities. First that the real density of Turks living abroad in Europe is generally lower than the 
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population offers two advantages as well. One is that consumer demand for European 
manufactured goods should increase proportionate to the population so long as growth of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) outpaces that of the citizenry. 93 Second, Turkey has a 
large, growing pool of inexpensive labor that could be employed by manufacturers 
desiring to produce products for export (but that labor pool is constrained by relatively 
poor education standards). 94 
respondents indicated or, second, that ethnic Europeans and Turks do not mix. Giving credence to the 
former hypothesis is the fact that Germany, which has the highest Turkish population in Europe at just 
over 2 million also had the second highest "yes/agree" response rate at 69 percent (Denmark was first at 
71 percent). 
93 Barham, p. I. 
94 
John Barham, "Riskier than Usual," Financial Times Survey, (6 December 1996), p. III. 
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ll. TURKEY: PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPE 
Turkish membership in the EU and WEU is predicated upon her desire to do so. 
The fall of the Soviet Union and impact ofthe Second GulfWar have changed the 
paradigm of Turkish-European relations and many Turkish experts no longer believe that 
Turkish membership is as important as it was prior to 1991.95 The implications for 
European and American economic and foreign policy are significant; therefore, 
considerations, pro and con, that Turkish leaders must weigh in their quest for EU and 
WEU membership need to be understood. 
A. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE, FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE 
Turkey finds herself at a crossroads between cultures, economies and politics and 
has commensurately complicated foreign policy concerns which may be larger than Europe 
wants to assume. 96 (see Map 1, page 32). "Turkey is connected geographically, ethnically 
or politically to the problems oflraq, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Cyprus, Greece, 
Bulgaria, Russia, Tajikistan, Syria and Islamic fundamentalism. [sic] Turkish foreign 
policy today is a 360-degree nightmare."97 Perhaps because ofthe vast array of foreign 
policy issues confronting her, Turkey seeks to influence events conservatively. To this 
end, Turkey has membership in almost all pertinent international organizations and exerts 
95 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modem Turkey, (NewYork: Routledge, 1993), pp. 225-227; 
Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," Foreign Affairs, (Spring 1991, Vol. 70, No.2), pp. 40-43; 
Lesser in Fuller, pp. 104-107; Oni~, pp. 52-57; Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey, A Modem History, (New York: 
LB. Tauris Publishers, 1994), pp. 321-322 
96 Note that by European standard of geography and population, Turkey is a large state with 
almost half the area of the original EU member states as well as being the second most populous after 
Germany and before France. 
97 Friedman, "Pay Attention as Turkey ... " 
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"a moderate influence" in all ofthem.99 
The foreign policy of Atatiirk provides a historical tradition for Turkey's 
conservative foreign policy. He strongly believed that the hard-won victories at Lausaune 
were best maintained through adherence to the status quo--i.e. non-involvement in extra-
Turkish issues culminating with neutrality during the Second World War100 This tradition 
of generally not taking the lead in independent foreign policy formulation seems to be 
changing somewhat today, but is still motivated by Atatiirk's policy of"Peace at home and 
peace in the world". 101 Turkey maintains that her desire to become a full member of the 
EU and WEU is a logical continuation of her traditional foreign policy and that 
membership would add increased credibility to her foreign policy initiatives such as 
formation of the Black Sea Economic Consortium and support of the Economic 
Cooperation Organization as well as add to her credibility as a secular Islamic state. 102 
Joining the EU as a full member increases Turkey's international influence by 
guaranteeing her a larger say in decision making and policy formulation than associate 
status presently allows. This is related to the right to vote and decision-making within the 
EU. As an associate member, Turkey can offer opinions and lobby for her desires, but she 
is not allowed to vote on them herself Additionally, a single "no" vote by any full 
member, such as Greece, is all that is required to defeat an initiative. Full membership, by 
99 David Barchard, "Staying Well Out of Russia's Orbit," Financial Times Survey, (14 May 
1984), P. VI. See, also, Appendix A for a list of all international organizations of which Turkey is a 
member. 
100 Zurcher, pp. 209-214. 
101 
"Interview with Turkey's Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal," Turkish Foreign Ministry 
Homepage at http://www.turkey.org/news/0216p09.htm (printed May 1996) and; "Politics and Policy," 
Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at http://www.turkey.org/p_rela03.htm, (as of23 October 1996). 
102 For more on the BSEC, see Chapter III, Section B, Part 1. 
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inference, would place Turkey in a position to respond in kind to those nations who would 
thwart Turkish desires as well as afford Turkey an equal footing for dialogue which might 
manage some volatile issues before they became serious. 103 Were Turkey to gain full EU 
membership, she expects to gain economically through EU grants, loans, and increased 
investment trade. Currently Turkey is not a full member and Greece, in particular, uses 
her vote freely in hindering actions that would benefit her neighbor. 104 CU already is seen 
as a validation of the goal ofEU membership: "The CU will open new horizons in many 
fields from foreign policy to the economy and will promote Turkey's regional importance. 
Having gained new weight, Turkey will continue to reinforce regional peace, stability and 
prosperity and the image 'Turkey a world state' will be strengthened."105 
Full membership in the WEU increases Turkish international influence by giving 
her a vote in an organization which she also perceives as subject to excessive Greek 
influence on the same basis as occurs within the EU. 106 Membership in the WEU would 
103 
"Turkey: Yilmaz Announces Reform Program," Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish, 
translation provided by FBIS, (6 May 1996). It is clear that Turkey already expects improved voice on CU issues: "Turkey, which has fulfilled the responsibilities stipulated by the CU agreements, is justified in 
expecting the same kind of responsible behavior from the EU and adamantly demands that all the provisions of the agreement be put into effect. This will ensure that the EU does not take sides in the disagreements between Greece and Turkey and that the full membership of Greece will not affect the 
relations between the EU and Turkey." 
104 
"Greece: Politicians' Reaction to Turkey's Claims on Island," Athens News in English from FBIS, (6 June 1996), p. 3; "Turkey: Officials on EU, Greek Positins on Yilmaz Offer," Ankara Turkish Daily News in English, from FBIS, (27 March 1996): "Turkey: Yilmaz 'Fails' to Change Greek, EU Positions," Ankara Turkish Daily News in English, from FBIS (26 March 1996); John Palmer, "Restraint Plea to Aegean Rival," London The Guardian, from FBIS, (27 Feb 1996); and "Brussels Backs Aegean Court Case," Financial Times, (22 Feb 96), p. 3. Numerous other sources are available. 105 
"Customs Union," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at http://www.turkey.org/news/ 0216po8.htm, (May 1996). 
1 06 On voting, the Brussels Treatv states in Article VIII, section 4, "The Council shall decide by 
unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed. In the cases provided for in Protocols II, III and IV it will follow the various voting procedures, unanimity, two-thirds 
majority, simple majority, laid down therein. It will decide by simple majority questions submitted to it by 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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also extend WEU Article 5 security guarantees to her international disputes with Greece, 
Armenia, Iran, Iraq and Syria (see Map 1, page 32). 107 WEU membership would also 
represent a significant deepening ofTurkey's relationship with NATO as a major 
component of the 'European Pillar ofNATO' which Turkey sees as a potential threat to 
NATO's premier role in European defense were a European Security and Defense Identity 
(ESDI) instituted outside ofNATO. 108 
Finally, WEU and EU membership might enhance Turkey's ability to negotiate 
with Syria, Iraq and Iran on issues of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) since it is 
already a major concern with Europeans and ofthe WEU. 109 This could happen several 
ways. First is that Turkish membership might allow Turkey to deal with her Middle 
107 Article 5 of the WEU Treaty, the "Brussels Treaty," states: "If any one of the High 
Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties 
will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party 
so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." (1954). Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, in turn, states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to 
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security." (San Francisco, 24 October 1945). 
Article 5 of the NATO Washington Treaty states, in part, "The Parties agree that an armed attack 
against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, 
and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occcurs, each of them [sic] will assist the Prty or 
Parties so attacked by taking [sic] such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." From NATO Handbook, (Brussels: NATO 
Office oflnformation and Press, 1992), p. 144. 
108 
"European Security and Defense Identity and Turkey," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at 
http://www.rnfa.tr/GRUPF/secure.htm, (18 May 1996). A major part of Turkish concern is, again, Article 
5 garantees because only full WEU members enjoy their benefit. In short, Turkey fears that an Europe 
without a powerful NATO implies a Turkey without a credible defense garantee. 
109 Mr. Kotsonis, Rapporteur, Parliamentary Co-Operation in the Mediterranean, WEU 
Unclassified document, WEU document 1485, (6 November 1995), pp. 27-39. The Appendix, 
"Proliferation and Arms Control in the Mediterranean" is quite forceful on this, fully backing the 
principle proposals of United States-proposed Middle East arms control initiative although WEU members 
deplore ongoing sales by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council including the 
United States. 
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Eastern neighbors from a position of greater strength. 110 Second is that she would have 
greater influence within the WEU and EU to exert pressure on border nations that develop 
and threaten to use WMD. 111 Lastly, assuming WEU Article 5 guarantees are taken 
seriously by nations bordering Turkey, there should be less threat of their use against 
Turkey by a rational actor. 112 
There is a downside to EU and WEU membership which Turkey's leaders have to 
consider as well. Purely as a point of conjecture, it is also possible that it is in Turkey's 
best interests vis-a-vis her neighbors to keep the WEU and EU at arms length--to maintain 
close ties but not actually accept membership. 113 The logic is clear, "one's allies tend to 
determine one's enemies." 114 This, though, does not seem to be a major concern for 
Turkey as evidenced by her continued desire for closer ties to Europe. 
B. SOCIAL CON SID ERA TIONS 
1. Validate Western Path 
Turkey is a nation at a crossroads between Europe and Asia, between Christianity 
and Islam and between the rich north and poor south. Turkey is the most significant 
example of a secular Islamic state and is therefore not widely accepted by her Middle 
110 Arguing for the opposite is the example OPEC which, without a military arm, successfully 
defied the combined economic giants of Europe and the United States in the 1970s. 
111 WMD are generally considered to include nuclear, chemical and biolical weapons as well as 
intermediate and long-range missile regardless of warhead. Kotsonis, p. 29. 
112 Irrational actors, such as Saddam Hussein who began the Second Gulf War with the 1990 
invasion of Kuwait, may not be influenced. Iraq's leader clearly was not daunted with taking on NATO 
forces (although they did not fight as part of NATO) as well as the national forces from other Middle 
Eastern countries and around the world simultaneously. His missile attacks on Israel with the knowledge 
of a strong American response short of counter use of WMD is a case in point. Ze'ev Schiff, "Israel After 
the War," Foreign Affairs, (Spring 1991, Vol. 70, No.2), pp. 22-23. 
113 Oni~, p. 48. 
114 Kuniholm, p. 48. 
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Eastern neighbors. Further, most Middle Eastern States identify themselves as Arab or 
Persian, not Turk. Finally, from the 16th century through World War I, major portions of 
the Middle Eastern nations bordering Turkey were ruled by the Ottomans whose Sultan 
regarded himself as the "keeper of the faith" and the leader of the Islamic world--whether 
the Arabs and Persians agreed or not. 
Turkey, as well, has an old western legacy beginning with contact with the 
retreating Byzantine Empire which culminated with the fall of Constantinople in 1453. 
With conquest much of the western legacy ofthe Byzantines was swept aside, but aspects 
of culture informally remained in the minority Greek, Jewish and Christian communities as 
well as formally in the Greek Orthodox church of which Sultan Mehmet II declared 
himself protector. 115 Since the 1500s, Turkey has been a major power broker in European 
affairs--albeit often on the enemy side and since the 17th century has been a significant 
economic player as well, although relatively backwards, especially in later years. 116 The 
attempted modernizations of the Ottoman Empire on a western model start with the 
Reform Edict of 183 9 and continued into the early 20th century although with numerous 
reverses. 117 Reverses included the suspension of the constitution in 1878 and the 
115 Metz, p. 19. Mehmet II, who captured Constantinople renamed it Istanbul, turned the 
cathedral ofHagia Sophia into a mosque and kept the city as the eccesiastical center of the Greek 
Orthodox Church with himself as its protector. 
116 Zurcher, pp. 17-21. . 
117 Zurcher, pp. 52-137. These reforms were primarily based on the British model based 
Britain's role as the the world's premier economic and military power. There is doubt as to the sincerity 
of Sultan Abdiilmecit based on issuance of the edict on the occassion of severe Ottoman reverses in Egypt. 
These reforms included: "The establishment of guarantees for the life, honour and property of the sultan's 
subjects; An orderly system of taxation to replace the system of tax-farming; A system of conscription for 
the army; and equality before the law of all subjects, whatever their religion." It was the Young Turks 
who, through a revolution, forced the reintroduction of the suspended Constitution (p. 97-98) with the 
hope of reviving the greatness of the old Ottoman Empire using western ideas (pp. 90-94). 
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reentrenchment of palace despotism at the same time. 118 It was the Young Turks who, 
through a revolution, forced the reintroduction of the suspended constitution with the 
hope of reviving the greatness of the old Ottoman Empire using western ideas in 1908. 119 
Their reforms alternated between liberalism and dictatorship, were interrupted by World 
War I, and finally culminated with Atatiirk's founding of modern Turkey in 1923. 
Atatiirk continued and accelerated the westernization of Turkey under a form of 
dictatorship called "Kemalism" after him. 120 Today, Kemalism is widely seen as a positive 
event and the dictatorship period which ended with the 1950 elections as necessary. The 
consensus among Turks is that without the strong hand of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Turkey 
would not have survived following World War I, nor would she have her present day 
unique status as a secular Islamic state. 121 Today, Turkey is a democratic state although 
many Europeans evidently think otherwise. 122 Proof that democracy is functioning is 
demonstrated by the military not interfering in Welfare's attainment of national leadership-
-a condition which through the 1980 coup, would almost surely have resulted in another 
military takeover. 123 A knowledge of Atatiirk' s far-reaching reforms is necessary to 
118 Ibid., p. 80. 
119 Ibid., pp. 90-98. The Young Turks were an organized group of western-educated (often in 
Paris) leaders motivated by ideals of Turkish nationalism. 
12
° Kemalism never became an all embracing ideology and, very significantly, meant very 
different things to different people. Under Atatiirk it was a dictatorship with some fascist overtones, but 
with some very important differences as well. Atatiirk, for example, never participated in mass rallies as 
did his contemporaries Mussolini and Hitler. Broadly defined, Kemalism (sometimes also called 
Atattirkism) relied on six arrows: republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and 
revolutionism. Ziircher, pp. 189-190 and 347-348. 
121 Zurcher, pps. 95-228, talks in detail about the meaning ofKemalism to the Turkish state. 122 See Appendix B, Tables B12 and B14c. 
123 It is noteworthy that the military and public are so aware of the concept of military 
intervention that the military has publicly indicated it would not intervene in civilian politics--so long as it 
does not attempt to impose fundamentalism on the country, Sami Kohen, "Islamic Party Win Worsens 
Turkey's East vs. West Woes," The Christian Science Monitor, (27 December 1995). 
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understand the tremendous human and political capital Turkey has invested in 






Caliphate, Islamic schools, seriat (Islamic Law) courts and the ministries 
of Seriat and Evkaf (pious foundations) were abolished. 
Sects and orders were banned and monastaries closed. 
Directorate ofReligious Affairs (DRA) replaced the two above-listed 
ministries. 124 
Also a Ministry of Education to supplant that of the religious order was 
created. 
Swiss civil code introduced. Voting right for women introduced. 
Constitution changed to say that Islam no longer the state religion 
Latin alphabet replaced Arabic 
Outlawing of traditional and religious garb 
Introduction of metric system and Gregorian calendar. 125 
The relevance of these reforms to modem Turkey is unquestioned and in fact they 
are specifically mentioned as part of the current Turkish constitution in Part V, 
(Miscellaneous Provisions), Article 174 which states "No provision of the Constitution 
shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated 
below, which aim to raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilization by 
referendum of the Constitution ofTurkey." These reform laws include most ofthe above 
in either fact or essence and specifically cover the educational system (1924), the wearing 
of hats ( 1925), the closing of religious institutions (1925), the adoption of international 
numbers and ofthe "Turkish Alphabet" (1928). The constitution further mentions the 
124 The Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) was ostensibly created to assist Islamic 
organizations in meeting the needs of the new Turkish State. Its duties included "administration of the 
mosques, the training of of new religious leaders, and the examination of the content of sermons in the 
mosques." In effect it served it served to repress much religious activity, especially that which competed 
with the state for influence and power. From Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party, and State: The 
Politicization oflslam in Turkey," Middle East Journal, (Volume 50, Number 1, Winter 1996), p. 42. 
125 Ayata, p. 41. 
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reforms laws that made marriages secular (1926), abolished certain titles such as Efendi, 
Bey or Pasa (1934) and prohibited the wearing of certain garments (1934). 126 
Today, Turkish membership in the EU and WED is seen by Turkey's leaders as the 
logical progression and vindication of secularization and westernization and therefore a 
deepening of Atati.irk' s legacy. 127 It is reasonable to expect that membership would be 
viewed as proof to Turkey's citizens that her political elite has not been pursuing an 
inappropriate foreign policy since Atati.irk and especially since World War II. Turkey's 
membership in the EU and WED, then, would demonstrate validity ofWesternization and 
secularization--or so it is hoped. 
2. Islamic Backlash 
There is, in fact, only one major danger to Turkey if she were to gain EU and 
WED membership. That is an increase in anti-western public opinion on a much larger 
scale than may have accompanied Turkish admission into the European Customs Union. 
The increasing share ofWelfare Party votes in the national December 1995 election can be 
seen as one manifestation of this. The evidence; however, is not conclusive, but is a 
concern to Turkey's leadership. 128 
126 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, from the Internet at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupi/ 
Anayasalil42.htm (1982). 
127 
"Turkey: Yilmaz Announces Reform ... ," In this wide-ranging speech, Prime Minister 
Mesut Yilmaz said "The main aim of our government --which -considers Turkey's integration with the EU 
and the modern world as its inalienable goal--is to help the CU succeed and ensure that it is of utmost 
benefit to Turkey." 
128 Keep in mind that although the Welfare Party was asked to and has formed the current 
Turkish government, their victory was hardly a clear majority as they only received 21% of the popular 
vote. Other factors that may have had more influence than CU include Turkey's relatively poor economic 
performance in 1994 and the first part of 1995. 
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The Turkish constitution goes out of its way to make allowances for the practice 
of religion (part 4, article 24). 129 As Islam is currently practiced in Turkey, despite 
western rhetoric to the contrary, there is no real risk of a true popular tum to 
fundamentalism. 130 There is, however, a very real chance that relatively conservative 
elements, such as the Welfare Party, will gain increased power and prestige--at least 
temporarily. 131 But even the Welfare Party may be too liberal and western leaning for 
Middle Eastern and North African Islamic countries as evidenced by the recent extreme 
example of Colonel Quadafi's rebuke to Primer Minister Erbakan for oppression ofthe 
Kurds and ties to the west. 132 More moderate examples have to be inferred. European 
leaders, for example, regard Turkey as an example of a secular Islamic state that should be 
emulated by other Muslim states and at least one prominent writer on Middle East affairs 
129 Part IV (Freedom of Religion and Conscience), Article 24, reads in part "Everyone has the 
right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction. Acts of worship, religious services, and 
ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that they do not violate the provisions of Article 14 
[Prohibition of Abuse of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms]. [sic] No one shall be allowed to exploit or 
abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the 
purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, 
political, and legal order of the State on religious tenets." 
130 Henze in Fuller, pp. 5-8. 
131 It is almost impossible to talk about the Welfare Party without, at the same time, talking about 
its leader, Necmettin Erbakan. A short biography from Zurcher (p. 353) reads "(1926- ). Graduated from 
Istanbul Technical University as an engineer (1948). Taught at the same establishment (as a professor 
from 1962). Came to the fore as president of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, where 
he was a spokesman for conservative small business. Elected to the assembly as an independent in 1969. 
In 1970 founded the 'National Order Party', which had Islamic fundamentalist traits. The party was 
closed down in 1971, and re-emerged as the 'National Salvation Party' in 1973. Erbakan became vice-
premier and minister of state in 1973, when his party joined the governing coalition with Ecevit's RPP. 
Served in the 'Nationalist Front' cabinets ofDemeril (1974-7). Banned from political life in 1980, he 
returned to head the 'Welfare Party' after 1987." 
132 
"Turkey should not fight against people seeking their independence"; and maintaining ties too 
close to the west, "Foreign powers have invaded Turkey, built bases on its soil and used those bases 
against Iraq. We oppose US bases in Turkey and membership in NATO." This insult almost resulted in a 
vote of no-confidence which Prime Minister Erbakan won by only a slim margin. Y alman Onaran, 
"Gadhafi Raps Turkey's Policies," Washington Post Online at http://wp2.washingtonpost.com/egi-
bin/dis ... al%3Astory%5Ftype%26and %26turkey"/o29%3AALL, (6 October 1996). 
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refers to the different types ofMuslim governments as an either or duality-- "Khomeinism 
or Kemalism." 133 
Even today, with Prime Minister Erbakan's moderation of his anti-western rhetoric 
due to the strongly pro-western stance of the junior coalition partner, the True Path Party, 
his comments on the EU as a "Christian club" haunt him and his bias was recently alluded 
to as the real reason he refused to attend the EU summit dinner in Dublin. 134 (The official 
Turkish line on his non-attendance is that there was a parliamentary debate on the budget 
bill on that date, the 14th of December 1996, and instead Assistant Prime Minister Ciller 
represented Turkey). 135 
Today, though, Turkish EU and WEU membership remains at the planning level. 
Nonetheless, it is at least suggestive that the fundamentally-inclined Welfare Party won the 
December vote only six days before CU went into effect on 1 January 1996.136 IfCU fails 
to live up to its billing as a vehicle to revamp and salvage the Turkish economy, it seems 
likely that fundamentalism of the state welfare type as exemplified by the Welfare Party 
will make an even stronger showing in the next polls although it appears highly unlikely, 
based on the previous analysis that Turkey is in danger ofbecoming a fundamental state. 
sect III. 
133 
Bernard Lewis, "Rethinking The Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Lexis/Nexis, (Fall, 1992), 
134 
"Turkey Will Not Attend Summit," BBC Radio News Service, (London, 2000 hours GMT, 4 
December 1996). 
135 
''Ciller to Attend Dublin Dinner," from Turkish Press Review on the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry Homepage on the Internet at http://mfa.gov.tr/, (4 December 1996). 
136 
A quick look at some of the poor statistics for Turkey from the table of economic indicators 
(see below) shows that other factors probably also played a key role in Welfare's victory. 
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C. ECONOMIC CONCERNS 
Turkish economic issues are already dominated by the European Union with 
which she conducts over 50 percent ofher trade. 137 The question the Turkish leadership 
must ask is what the effect of closer economic integration with Europe as best exemplified 
by CU will be. A Customs Union is "an agreement among two or more trading partners 
to remove all tariff and non-tariff trade barriers among themselves [and] impose identical 
trade restrictions against nonparticipants. " 138 
For a customs union to succeed it should fulfill several requirements. It should be 
relatively large in terms ofboth economic size and number of nations and the economies 
of the member nations should be relatively comparable in size and sophistication with one 
another. For Turkey, the first requirement is clearly met--the EU is the world's largest 
trading bloc. 139 The second requirement is not clearly met. Although Turkey has a strong 
economy relative to much of the world, it is relatively weak and more centrally organized 
than those of other EU members to include even Portugal and Greece, which are two of 
the poorest members. (See Table 2, page 44). 
Table 2 indicates that Turkey has about half the GDP per capita of even the 
poorest EU members, has a population growth rate many times higher and an inflation rate 
that appears to be almost out of control. According to Carbaugh this places Turkey at a 
137 Oni~, p. 56. 
138 Robert J. Carbaugh, International Economics, (Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Publishing 
Co., 1995), p. 247. 
139 NAFTA is the second largest although some analysists believe it has the potential ofbecorning 
larger than the EU. See "The Impact of NAFT A on Direct Investment in the United States," Area 
Development Online, http://www.area-development.com/LO _ THREE.HTM, (as of 19 December 1996). 
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Table 2: Selected Nations: Key Economic Indicators140 
distinct disadvantage with respect to the rest of the EU since the theory of customs union 
proposes that she will not be able to compete. 141 Turkey counts on the dynamic gains due 
to greater participation in a larger market with enhanced economies of scale, increased 
competitiveness, and a greater stimulus for private and foreign investment. 142 
Opponents to CU have several major concerns and although one can argue they 
are crying "foul" after the fact, their opinions are likely to gain credence if Turkey is 
unable to show significant real progress as a result of closer ties to the EU through CU. 
The most important issue those opposed to CU have is that Turkey has become a country 
"that has to comply automatically with a trade mechanism that is determined by the 
interests of the member states."143 Further the 6 March 1995 CU agreement makes 
140 The World Fact Book, (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), multiple pages. 
141 For more information on customs union and how it relates to the European Union, see 
Carbaugh, pp. 247 to 254. 
142 
"The Customs Union Between Turkey and the European Union," Turkish Foreign Ministry 
Homepage at http://www.turkey.org/custl.htm, (22 November 1996). 
143 Erol Manisali, Political and Economic Cost of the Customs Union, Chapters IV and V, 
translated from Turkish by FBIS, (8 April 1996). 
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absolutely no reference to future Turkish EU membership, thereby allowing Europe the 
advantages, from their perspective, of unlimited trade without any ofthe negatives such as 
what were part of the 1970 Additional Protocol. 144 
Further, although Turkey's figures may look bad, it must be remembered that the 
EU embraced Greece, Portugal and Spain although their economies at the time of 
accession were significantly weaker than those of the core members. The high inflation 
figure actually has a relatively mild affect on Turks as wage changes and costs of goods 
and services are adjusted regularly and automatically to account for it. 145 Nonetheless, 
Turkey's leaders are hoping that CU will force the economy to more rapidly privatize, 
increase efficiency through increased outside investment in capital means of production, 
and coincidentally lower the inflation rate to something much closer to the European 
average. In sum, Turkey's leadership has weighed the economic issues and determined 
that full EU membership remains the logical progression of Atatiirk's reforms. 
Generally, it is elements of the Turkish left and right who provide the main 
opposition to the goal ofEU (and CU) membership. To the Turkish left, EU membership 
appears to be more akin to a view expressed in Transitions From Authoritarian Rule. 
These are "guarantees and reassurances it [EU membership] could provide to those 
conservatives and upper-class groups ... that [are] most likely to feel threatened by 
144 The 1970 Additional Protocol was a roadmap ofEU and Turkish provision that were to be met 
as a prior condition for Turkish entrance into the EU. The conditions which the EU rescinded and which 
were not reintroduced as part of the 6 March 1996 CU agreement are "(1) free circulation oflabor, (2) 
free circulation of capital and (3) financial aid (specifically, the Fourth Financial Protocol of 1981)." 
From Manisali. See also Text of Decision No. 1/95 (Customs Union) of the EC-Turkey Association 
Council of 6 March 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union (DECISION. 1/95), from 
Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at http://www.turkey.org/cust2.htm, (6 March 1995). 
145 According to Paul B. Henze, "Elaborate indexing arrangements have mitigated its effects." 
From "Turkey: Toward the Twenty-first Century," in Fuller, p. 16. 
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popular government."146 Although the elite of Turkey definitely is generally wed to the 
goal of further westernization, it is not just an upper -class phenomena foisted on hapless 
masses. "Most Turks want continued modernization, improvements in the quality oflife, 
opportunity to better themselves as a result of education and work. Their aims are those 
of most Western-oriented societies. [sic] Atatiirk' s principles continue to be accepted by 
most Turks as the basis for modern life and existence of the republic." 147 
Turkey wants into the EU and WED for economic and political reasons which 
overall serve to bolster Turkish interests at home and abroad. 148 To this end, Turkey has 
been willing to accept concessions on membership in these and related organizations with 
the idea that eventually she will obtain what she wants. The problem is not usually one of 
all the EU nations joining forces against Turkey, as much as that any one EU member can 
veto or stall the effort of the other 14 since all EU decisions require unanimity. Historical 
instances of European interference in Turkish affairs include withholding of monies 
promised for development and suspension by the CofE due to the 1980 coup. As 
Customs Union (CU) demonstrates, even today, admission in fact does not guarantee 
admission in deed. 149 
The most recent case of Turkey not enjoying promised benefits involved the Greek 
veto of the Turco-European Union Association Council Meeting, the reason being that 
146Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, after 1990), p. 23. This book also points out that the EU accepted Spain, Portugal and Greece when 
at least Spain and Greece still had some very real difficulties with democratic traditions. 
147 Paul B. Henze, "Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century," from Fuller, p. 3. 
148 
"Customs Union." 
149 For the viewpoint of Turkish analysts against CU see Manisali and Tarhan. For a strong 
Islamic viewpoint, see, "Turkey-EU Customs Union Called 'Anexation,'" Tehran Voice of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in Turkish, translation by FBIS, (2 January 1996). 
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part of Turkey's offer of "unconditional dialogue" (on Cyprus and Aegean issues) 
included a number of talking points which Athens is unwilling to discuss (mainly 
territorial), and because it fell short of Greek demands, again with respect to territorial 
issues. 150 Ankara became worried enough to issue a statement saying that the EU must be 
aware that any failure to carry out obligations by the European Union was "an attitude 
that had legal consequences" and that "third factors" outside the CU would cause Turkey 
to reassess its own obligations toward the EU. 151 On a bilateral basis there does not seem 
to be a problem as shown by Italy's statement in the same article that "Turks and Greeks 
should solve their problems in a platform independent of the customs union" since 
"financial cooperation is also agreed upon and has to be respected by the Fifteen." The 
key point is that even being "in" does not automatically confer on Turkey the advantages 
she desires from CU. 
D. SOVEREIGNTY 
The issue of sovereignty is two-sided and includes elements of foreign as well as 
domestic policy in the judicial and economic realms. Turkey must decide how much 
sovereignty she is willing to give up to pursue the benefits offull acceptance into the 
European club. Currently, the Turkish leadership seems unwilling to make this leap, 
especially with the Welfare Party at the helm. 
150 The territorial issues not addressed by the Council agenda specifially include EU failure to 
agree that "Greek territory is also the territory of Europe" as well as failure to address issues of territory 
strongly enough with the International Court of Justice which will eventually give a ruling on Greek-
Turko Aegean and Cypriot disputes. Nazlan Ertan, "Turkey: Official on EU, Greek Positions on Yilmaz 
Offer," Ankara Turkish Daily News in English, from FBIS, (27 March 1996). For more detailed 
information on Greek-Turkish issues and how they relate to the EU, see Chapter III, Part A. 
151 Nazlan Ertan, "Turkey: Official on EU, Greek Positions on Yilmaz Offer," Ankara Turkish 
Daily News in English, from FBIS, (27 March 1996). 
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1. Foreign policy 
Increased international influence would come at a steep price which many Turks, 
including a powerful minority of the elite, are not willing to pay. The drawback is the 
correspondingly louder voice Europeans would have in Turkish affairs. Currently, when 
Turkey acts as her own political center as she has often done since the fall of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, Europeans may become upset, but are able to remain relatively indifferent 
overall since Turkey's actions do not obligate them either with respect to Turkey or the 
country with which she has been dealing. 152 It might appear that this is untrue since 
Europe very clearly has close ties with Turkey, most notably through NATO. These ties 
fade in significance, however, when one realizes that in issues involving NATO, both 
Europeans and Americans expect the United States to take the lead (as, for example, 
happened in Bosnia and then again in the recent Kardak/lmia Islands dispute). 153 Hence, 
under the present arrangement with Turkey in the U.S. orbit as much as in the European, 
Turkey is able to take independent foreign policy positions without overly upsetting 
Europeans. 
The recent examples of President Erbakan's state visits to Iran and Libya are cases 
in point. Had Turkey been a full member of the WEU or EU and made the same unilateral 
152 Some examples of Turkish independence since the fall of the Soviet Union are founding of the 
BSEC, participation in the ECO, cross-border operations into Iraq against the PKK, formation of closer 
ties with the Turkic republics of the Confederation of Independent States and advances to other Islamic 
countries such as Iran, Syria, Libya, Singapore and Pakistan. Obviously, these fall into several categories 
affecting Europe: no effect (Singapore for example), negative effect (PKK) and a positive effect (CIS). 
153 Gordon, p. 6; "Deputies Fault EU's Handling of Aegean Turmoil," p. 5; and "Cyprus: 
Kliridhis Questions EU as Security Guarantor," pp. 8-11. 
48 
advances, Europe might have found it in her interests to voice greater objection (although 
still somewhat muted since Europe also has economic ties with these two countries). 
The positive side of an increased European voice in Turkish affairs is as an 
additional voice for Turkey. For example, EU membership might translate into the much-
desired construction of an oil pipeline from Central Asian or Caucasian fields through 
Turkey. 154 On the surface this issue appears economic but it is really a political one with 
economic underpinnings that have been strengthened by the aftermath of the Second Gulf 
War. As part of the Allied embargo against Iraq, Turkey shut off the pipeline from Iraq to 
the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in 1990. This has resulted in the loss of over 
US $2 billion per year to Turkey and contributes to a large degree to the economic 
problems she is currently having. (The total economic effect, using a multiplier of five 
equals an astounding US $72 billion over the last six years). 155 Today, Turkey is seeking 
the transit of Central Asian oil through Turkey as part of a bid for diversification of her 
revenue basis using the logic that diversification is also in European (and American) best 
interests. 156 
154 Stephen J. "Blank, Energy and Security in Transcaucasia," Strategic Studies Institute, (7 
September 1994 ), pp. 19-20; and "Transporting Caspian Sea Region Oil, The Mediterranean Route: An 
Environmental Alternative," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at http://turkey.org/pipeline.htm (as of 
11 September 1996). 
155 Kuniholm, pp. 37-38. Turkey maintains she lost over US $2 billion in revenue over the first 
three months of the crisis which rose to US $9 billion in succeeding months. Turkey was compensated, 
but inadequately in her opinion. Compensation included US$ 8 billion in arms from the U.S and 
Germany, US $2.2 billion in oil, grants and loans from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, 
Japan, France and the EC as well as possible Kuwaiti reconstruction contracts. Additionally, the U.S. 
raised its security assistance package to $635.4 million of which $500 million was a grant. 
156 Blank, pp. 19-20; and "Transporting Caspian Sea Region Oil." The closure of the Iraqi 
pipeline by the United Nations is seen as supporting the argument for diversification. 
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2. Domestic Policy--Legal 
Turkey has a complicated domestic policy which membership in the EU and WEU 
would affect and which is already being affected by membership in the CU. The question 
Turkish leaders must answer is whether the loss of internal national flexibility engendered 
by EU and WEU membership would offset gains in other areas as outlined in this chapter. 
One of the major problems Turkey is having deals with human rights and the rule oflaw. 
The Turkish Constitution exacerbates this problem since it incorporates many legal aspects 
that would have better been addressed at a lower judicial level. The result is that Turkish 
Constitution is sometimes at odds with the mores ofthe EU. 157 That Turkey recognizes 
differences and the inherent inflexibility ofher constitution in dealing with certain domestic 
issues is shown by her enactment of constitutional amendments as a condition for CU. 158 
a. Human Rights/Rule of Law 
A recent example of problems of the Turkish Constitution, lack of 
flexibility and the rule of law which has proven troubling for Turkey as well as for Europe 
was Turkey's 1994 arrest of eight members of parliament, seven of them Kurdish and one 
Islamist, for "supporting separatism and committing crimes against the state, punishable by 
death." Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, responded to European condemnation ofwhat she 
regarded as an internal Turkish matter with a constitutional justification: "From the very 
157 
For further reference, see "Constitution of the Republic of Turkey," on the Internet at 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupi/Anayasa/il42.htm, (as of23 July 1996); and "The Maastricht Treaty," on the 
Internet at http://www.ced.lu/en/record/mt!top.htrnl. This web address accesses the complete treaty as of 
25 April 1996. 
158 Part of the democratic reform process caused by CU were sixteen amendments to the 
Constitution affecting such fundamental areas as voting age, trade unions, the education system, terrorism 
and freedom of expression. From "The Customs Union Between Turkey and the European Union," 
Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at http://www.turkey.org/custl.htm, (as of 22 November 1996). 
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first day, they displayed different flags and colors. They tried to speak in a different 
language . . . This was against the constitution. Freedom is not a license to violate the 
constitution."159 Essentially the eight were accused ofviolating Article 3 of the Turkish 
constitution which reads, in part; that "The Turkish State, with its territory and nation, is 
an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish. Its flag, the form of which is prescribed by 
the relevant law, is composed of a white crescent and star on a red background .... " 
Article 14 further states; that "None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the 
Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the 
State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and 
Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms .... " The problem for Turkey is 
how to preserve governmental prerogatives without being in contradiction of free speech 
rights as expected by EU countries. This situation might appear to have only a minimal 
chance at improving in the near future as the government under Prime Minister Erbakan 
heightens pressure on the Turkish media based on his perception ofbiased news coverage 
of a bizarre car accident involving a wanted gangster, his girlfriend, a senior policeman 
and a member of parliament. He and Welfare generally view the news media as anti-
Islamic and have expressed their desire to curb it. 160 
159 
"Ankara Hits Back at Western Detractors," Mideast Mirror, access provided by MediaGen 
(UK) Ltd. through Lexis/Nexis, (Vol. 8, No. 50, 14 March 1994). 
160 John Barham, "Erbakan turns the screw on Turkish Media," Financial Times, (26 November 
1996), p. 4. On the car accident he says "[Three weeks ago] A car carrying a wanted gangster, his 
girlfriend, a senior policeman and a government MP [Member of Parliament] crashed into a truck. All 
died except the MP, Mr. Sedat Bucak, who belongs to the centre-right True Path party, the Islarnists' 
junior coalition partner." See also Stephen Kinzer, "Scandal Links Turkish Aides to Deaths, Drugs, and 
Terror," New York Times, pp. Aland A7, (10 December 1996). 
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Two things work against his desired media reform. One is the detail of 
Turkish law and the level at which minutiae are addressed. Turkey has a difficult task 
when it comes to modifying her laws because so many of them are at the highest judicial 
level and because there are so many minor, but very detailed ones. The difficulty can be 
shown with a look at free-speech rights which have "154 rules concerning freedom of 
expression." Minor points include such items as a prohibition against criticizing the armed 
forces, Atatiirk or the courts. 161 
The second point making governmental tightening of free speech more 
difficult includes reforms made by previous governments, most notably the 
demonopolization of television a decade ago. Then there was only TRT (Turkish Radio 
Television). Today there are over 260 local and national television stations, many of 
which produce some of their own programs. 162 In the near-term the sheer size of the mass 
media makes it unlikely that the government, even one somewhat opposed to critical free 
speech, such as the present one, will be able to effectively censor the mass media, 
especially on minor points. 163 
Turkish law is excessively precise although in special cases it may be of 
benefit in curbing some government excesses. Turkish leaders realize this and they appear 
to be doing as much as is reasonably possibly to enact reforms quickly. A key example is 
Turkey's willingness to make constitutional changes in support of CU and her apparant 
willingness to further modify her legal system in order to meet European standards for EU 
161 Ibid. One has to wonder what Europeans thought of efforts in the United States to make flag 




and WEU membership. As other discussion shows, changes to her legal and human rights 
system are not just a one-time event, but have been progressing over a very long period of 
time and through many different governments since 1945 and today many improvements 
are well-entrenched. 
b. Kurds 
The issue of the Kurds would normally be considered as a sub-category of 
human rights/rule oflaw were the Kurds not a topic of major importance in both Turkey 
and Europe. For a long time, Turkey's means of dealing with the Kurdish issue was to 
treat it as a non event and impose such seemingly benign restrictions as making Turkish 
the only language ofTurkey164 . 
Turkey appears to want to handle the issue of the terrorist Kurds 
organization, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), unilaterally. They also know that Europe 
responds strongly to any action taken by Turkey against the PKK and the Kurds in 
general. Evidence of this knowledge includes waiting until immediately after the CU 
treaty was signed (6 March 1996), before launching a 35,000 soldier cross-border action 
into Iraq (20 March 1996)--an action which Turkey knew would embarrass EU and lend 
credence to the warnings of European human rights observers. 165 
For Turkey terrorism is also an international issue. Indeed there are 
substantiable allegations ofPKK terrorist comming from Russia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria 
164 Henze in Fuller, pp. 21-27 and Article 3 of the Constitution, "Its (Turkey's) language is 
Turkish." Since 1991, use ofKurdish has been permitted in private, Bob Hepburn, "Turkey's Civil War 
Heating Up, Ankara Launches Crackdown Against 'Kurdish Problem'," The Toronto Star from 
Lexis/Nexis, (17 April1994), p. C5. 
165 
"Turkey Politics," International Countrr Risk Guide: Middle East and North Africa from 
Lexis/Nexis, (Information Access Company, 1 July 1995), Section No.7. 
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and even Europe. 166 The difference between European terrorist support and the others is 
the level at which it occurs. At the official level, international terrorism is clearly 
condemned by all EU countries and there is no longer any official support for any 
organization employing terrorist tactics. 167 There is, however, a significant amount of 
private support, particularly from Kurdish expatriates living in Europe who are often 
forced to give money and support. According to Der Spiegel Kurdish separatist leaders in 
Germany routinely extort money from their countrymen to finance PKK operations within 
Turkey and abroad. 168 The other countries mentioned, though, have given at least semi-
official moral and often material support to the PKK. 
Like other issues of sovereignty the Kurdish problem is double-sided. With 
CU and especially with membership in the WEU and EU, Turkey may hope to better 
affect Russian policy with respect to the Kurds which is often linked to oil issues since 
1991. Although senior Russian leaders do not seem to have a statement on the Kurds, 
lower level leaders, including some in the Duma, support the people who say things like 
"Unless the government resolves the problem of the 12 million Kurdish People, explosions 
166 Russia: Henze in Fuller, p. 24, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon: "Terrorists," Political Risk 
Services, (1 January 1993); Europe: Germany: PKK Defectors Describe Party ... 167 Until approximately 1993, various European governments to include France, Germany, and 
Belgium did not recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization. Hence, the PKK was able to openly hold 
meetings and support rallies in these and other countries (See, for example, "Germany, Netherlands 
Criticised as Kurd Parliament-In-Exile Meets," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, (12 Aprill995). It was not 
until Abdullah Ocalan began espousing terrorism as means to an end in both Turkey and Europe that 
European countries outlawed the organization (See, for example, Stephen Kinzer, "Anti-Turkey Kurdish 
Separatists Blamed for Attacks Accross Europe," New York Times from Lexis/Nexis, (5 November 1993), 
Section A, p. 6; and Tomas Avenarius, "Ocalan Threatens 'Suicide Attacks' in Turkey, Germany," 
Munich Siiddeutsche Zeitung in German, translation by FBIS, (30 March 1996), p. 9). 168 
"Myth of Omnipotence: Two Prosecution Witnesses Reveal the Methods of the Proscribed 
Kurd Organization," from Hamburg Der Spiegel in German, from FBIS, (1 April 1996), pp. 62-69. 
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will rock the pipeline that conveys oil from Baku (Azerbaijan)."169 Alexsandr Nevzorov 
(department head of the ministerial-level Internal Intelligence Service) said in response to 
Turkish allegations that Duma members officially attended a PKK meeting ( 4-8 May 
1996), that the "PKK is not a terrorist organization." In the same article, Vladimir 
Pavlovich (a representative of the Russian Foreign Economic Relations Ministry) said of 
the PKK, "We give them certain means and we will continue to do so."170 Turkey is not a 
pure victim in this as there is also evidence to indicate she was supporting the Chechens in 
kind, but Europe apparently does not have an opinion on this. 171 
Syria presents a case where EU economic clout could also have some 
meaning. As of 1991, 48% of her exports and 3 7% of her imports came from the EU.172 
In a meeting between President Demirel and Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad in 1993, Mr. 
Asad continued to deny Syrian support of the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, 
169 Semen Bagdasarov and Aleksandr Shinkin, "Ankara's Obscure War--What Is the Aim of 
Turkey's 'Strike of Steel' in Northern Iraq?," from Almaty Dozhivem Do Ponedelnika in Russian, from 
FBIS (26 January 1996), p. 10. 
170 Remzi Oner Ozkan, "Russia: Turkey Questions 'Official Support' for PKK," from Ankara 
Anatolia in Turkish, from FBIS, (1415 GMT, 22 May 1996). That Russia's foreign policy is confused on 
the PKK is undoubted. In this article yet another Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman is quoted to say 
"We reaffirm our official stand, that Russia does not recognize the PKK and opposes all kinds of 
terrorism. There has been no change in our policy toward Turkey or in our stand against the PKK." 
171 It is important to note that the majority of Russian pipeline routes from the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, both proposed and actual, must pass through Chechnya and its capital, Grozny and goes far 
to explain Russian interests in the their break-away republic and counter Russian claims that Turkey was 
giving support to Chechen rebels. For a brief summary of the Turkish Russian controversy surrounding 
Turkish support of Chechen rebels see the following articles: "Selin Caglayan, "A Bargain on Chechenya 
and the PKK," from Istanbul Hurriyet in Turkish, translation by FBIS, (23 July 1995), p. 19; "In 
Response to President Yeltsin's Statement Re: Chechen Leader Dudayev," from a Turkish Embassy Press 
Release, from the Internet at http://turkey.org/releases/09895a.htrn, (Washington, DC, 18 June 1995); 
Boris Yeltsin, "RTV Carries 19 October Yeltsin News Conference," Moscow Russian Television Network 
in Russian, translation provided by FBIS, (1735 GMT, 19 October 1995); and "Turkish Foreign Ministry 
Denies Training Chechnians in Turkey," from a Turkish Embassy Press Release, from the Internet at 
http://turkey.org/releases/102395a.htrn, (Washington, DC, 18 June 1995). 
172 9 World, p. 40 . 
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despite Turkish presentation of"pictures of Abdullah Ocalan in Damascus ... along with 
his home telephone number, and his address." 173 In the same article, Demirel maintains 
that despite Syrian denials, there has been no real change in Syrian support for the PKK as 
late as July 1996. Assuming reports from Ankara are truthful (and there is no reason to 
doubt their veracity) it stands to reason that Turkish EU membership could be highly 
influential in pressuring Syria to end her support of the PKK. This is even more likely 
given that the PKK has now been labeled a terrorist organization by European nations as 
well and that membership would give Turkey greater clout in favorably pressuring other 
Middle Eastern nations. With the high economic and political cost of the war against the 
PKK as well as its seeming ineffectiveness, Turkey should seriously consider working 
closer with Europe rather than using her sovereignty to pursue a unilateral policy. 
3. Domestic Policy--Economic 
Current membership in the CU is said to violate Turkish sovereignty because 
certain economic decision-making authority has been transferred to the EU without an 
reciprocal increase in Turkish voice in the EU since none is allowed for in the 1963 
Ankara Agreement which bestowed Associate status on Turkey. 174 According to one 
Turkish economic analyst, Turkey must comply with EU mechanisms without having a 
voice in the body which debates and makes EU economic policy. 175 In actuality, there 
173 
Makram Muhammad Ahmad, "InteiView with Turkish President Suleyman Demirel," from 
Cairo al-Musawwar in Arabic, translation by FBIS, (26 July 1996), pp. 18-21 and 82-83. 
174 
Manisali. See also M. Orhan Tarhan, "Turkey Enters the Customs Union," Open Media 
Research Institute, from the Internet at http://pulex.med.virginia.edu/ttt@mersina/Opinionffarhan! 
Tarhan@01_01_96.htm: and Heinz Kramer, Treibt die Zollunion die EU und die Tiirkei auseinander?, 
(Ebenhausen, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 1995). 
175 Ibid. 
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already is a provision in the CU Treaty which allows for arbitration within limits. With the 
newness of CU it has not yet been tested, but it clearly demonstrates that there are two 
viewpoints on this issue and that the Turkish signers of the agreement did consider the 
issue of sovereignty. 176 Further, many of the same "rights" given up by Turkey are applied 
equally to the EU, such as rules on General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 177 
Finally, Turkey remains a sovereign nation and thereby has at least three options 
with respect to CU that are unaffected by the CU treaty. First, if CU fails, she could 
consider canceling the agreement--obviously with tremendous ramifications for her bid to 
attain EU (and WEU) membership. Second, ifCU is clearly ofbenefit to Turkey, then she 
continues to retain the right to petition for full EU membership assuming other 
considerations do not negatively outweigh the economic factor. Lastly, Turkey could 
maintain the status quo while bringing pressure on EU members to both meet all the 
agreements of the CU treaty as well as to modifY provisions disagreeable to Turkey. 
Other CU and EU issues include affects on the internal economy, particularly with 
respect to competitiveness. Again, though, Turkey has decided that modifYing her internal 
economic rules and regulations in accordance with the CU treaty serves her overall 
interests better than keeping the old system. Reforms are far-reaching and are sure to 
have repercussions for the next several years at least. As a result of 'giving up' relative 
176 Text ofDecision No. 1/95 (Customs Union). . . Articles 35 through 38 are the relevant 
articles. Article 38, part 1 states, in part, "If the Community or Turkey considers that a particular practice 
is incompatible with the terms of Articles 32, 33, or 34 and is not adequately dealt with under the 
implementing rules referred to in Article 37 or in the absence of such rules, and if such practice causes or 
threatens to cause serious prejudice to the interest of the other Party or material injury to its domestic 
industry, it may take appropriate measures after consultation with the Joint Customs Union Committee or 
after 45 working days following referral for such consultation. [sic]." 
177 Text of Decision No. 1/95, Article 38, part 2. 
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sovereignty, Turkey has changed, enacted or repealed laws and regulations in the areas of 
tariffs, internal taxes, worker and environmental safety, subsidies to domestic firms, state 
monopolies, intellectual property rights, and foreign and domestic competitiveness. 178 
Further, she is voluntarily revamping her textile and agricultural policy to be compatible 
with the EU' s. 179 
178 
"The Customs Union Between ... "; and Hi~, pp. 17-23. 
179 
"The Customs Union Between .... " 
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ITI. EUROPE-PERSPECTIVE ON TURKEY 
Views from Europe on Turkish membership are mixed. There seems little doubt 
that Europe wants to maintain close ties with Turkey, but there is not a consensus from 
either a security or economic point of view that bringing Turkey into the EU or WEU is 
"the natural economic counterpart of its political relationship with the West. " 180 As is the 
case for Turkish motivations for seeking admission, the issues for Europe also often have 
two sides of which many are economic in nature although it might seem, on the surface, 
that they should be security-related instead. The Turkish Straits, which historically have 
been a military concern to Europeans, is a case in point. Today, despite the WEU's 
military aspect, the primary importance of this critical waterway is economic and Europe 
seeks influence through political and economic means rather than militarily. 
A. COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP) 
1. NATO/WEU 
Europe must consider how NATO and the United States will react to Turkish 
WEU membership. On the surface it is unlikely there would be a problem since Turkey is 
already covered under Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty which extends it NATO defense 
guarantees. 181 Additionally, Turkish WEU full membership would probably be perceived 
by the United States as a deepening of cohesion among NATO partners at the European 
level. 182 This could, however, add strength to the American Congress' argument that 
180 Tonge. 
181 For a comparison of NATO and the WEU's Article 5, see footnote APPX 100 of the 
182 Semih D. Idiz, "Global Approach in Ties with U.S. Sought," Ankara Turkish Daily News in 
English, from FBIS, (11 April 1995), pp. 1, A8. This article says Assistant Secretary of State, Richard C. 
"Holbrooke, for one, is a strong proponent of these links but believes they should develop without 
excluding Southeastern Europe and particularly Turkey, which lie believes is a key country in any 
European security architecture."; also Jopp, p. 34. 
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Europe is capable of defending itself without United States direct participation. Under the 
Frank Amendment, this could lead to even deeper cuts in American force structure in 
Europe as well as eventual discontinuation of America's nuclear umbrella over Europe.183 
Europe must decide, from its point of view, whether Turkey is a frontier or buffer 
nation. The question may seem trite on the surface, but the eventual desirability of 
bringing Turkey into the WEU (and EU) depends upon the classification. If Turkey is a 
frontier state, it is by implication a member of the European community, albeit one on the 
periphery. 184 A buffer state, on the other hand, is a convenience. It may have many of the 
appearances of being a member state, but ultimately it is an asset based on its geopolitical 
position, not on an emotional tie. 185 
The European fear is that a formalization of defense ties to Turkey would make 
Turkey's problems, Europe's problems, and Turkey has more than a few that are causing 
difficulties with the relatively informal purely-European ties that presently exist. 186 
Primary among European concerns is extension of the Kurdish problem which is also a 
183 The Frank Amendment did not pass but was a major attention-getter for security experts in 
both the United States and Europe since it would have effectively forced the withdrawal of many U.S. 
troops from Europe for financial support "burden sharing" reasons. See H.R. 1621, "Increased European 
Contributions for Maintenance of U.S. Military Personnel and Installations, Provision," (20 September 
1993 ). Regardless, it appears that U.S. troop strength in Europe is headed to "100,000 or 75,000 or less." 
From Jopp, p. 35. 
184 British deputy Lord Finsberg appears to believe that Turkey is a frontier state. In late 1996, 
he recommended that the WED's associate members should be allowed to sign the Brussels Treaty. Prior 
to Greek admission into the WEU, he had recommended that Turkey and Greece enter the WEU at the 
same time. From "Report: Turkey Should Sign Article 5 of WEU Accord," Turkish Daily News, 
http://home.imc.net/turkey/news/e120l.htm, (1 December 1995). 
185 Kramer's article appears to take the view that Turkey is more of a buffer state rather than a 
true member of Europe stating "Jeder deutsche oder westliche Versuch, die Tiirkei zu sehr in eine aktiv 
ordnungsgestaltende Rolle zu drangen oder deren Wiinschbarkeit zu prononciert hervorzuheben, kann zur 
Destabilisierung der Tiirkei und zur weiteren AushOhlung des deutsch-ttirkischen Verhaltnisses 
beitragen." p. 60. 
186 Jed C. Snyder, "Turkey's Role in the Greater Middle East," Joint Force Quarterly, (Autumn 
1995, No. 9) talks succinctly about Europe's issues with Turkey. 
60 
human rights problem.187 The PKK, for example, has carried out acts of terrorism within 
Germany and France and has threatened German leaders for not taking a firmer stance 
against Turkish oppression of the Kurds. 188 Many Europeans believe that a security union 
with Turkey will force them to assist Turkey in controlling the Kurds, especially ifKurds 
from outside of Turkey carry out operations within Turkey.189 
The Kurdish issue is feared for another reason, namely as a demonstration of the 
risk of European entanglement in Middle East affairs. 190 Turkish full membership in the 
WEU (and EU) effectively extends Europe's borders to the Middle East and Caucasus 
(see Map 1). This was a significant NATO concern when the decision to accept Turkey as 
a member was made in 1952.191 Were Turkey granted membership, Europe's borders 
would become Turkey's, and the EU and WEU are anxious that the garrulous nations 
around Turkey would attempt to involve Europeans in their local concerns. This has 
particular ramifications for trade, especially oil, but also with respect to the large quantity 
of exports that Europe has to the Middle East. Europe must also consider what non-
membership in the EU and WEU means to Turkey. In the words ofLord Finsberg of 
Great Britain, "If Turkey comes to the opinion that its full membership in the WEU and 
187 Mauther; John Marks, "Derailing Troubled Turkey," U.S. News and World Report from 
Lexis/Nexis, (November 1992, Vol. 113, No. 18), p. 73; Turkey Politics; "Government Faces Growing 
Criticism of Kurdish Policy," Middle East Business Weekly, (10 April1992, Vol. 36, No. 14) p. 25. 
188
"PKK droht mit Gewalt und Anschlagen--Verschiirfte SicherheitsmaBnahmen", Deutschland 
Nachrichten, (New York: German Information Center, 5 April1996), p. 1. 
189 This has already happened within NATO. With respect to Germany's 1993 crackdown on the 
Kurds, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said, "Germany had obligations to Turkey, a fellow NATO 
member .... " "Turkey," Mideast Mirror from Lexis/Nexis (VoL 7, No. 230, 26 November 1996). 
190
"Herzog: 'Die Europii.er Leben in geborgter Sicherheit'", Deutschland Nachrichten, (New 
York: German Information Center, 8 March 1996), p. 2; Etty, Opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee on Relations Between the European Union and the Middle East, Lexis/Nexis, (Commission of 
the European Communities, 13 November 1995). 
191 vali, p. 152. 
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the European Union is not to be realized, it may question its policies so far, including its 
participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."192 
Israel could become a greater concern as well. Turkey is one of the few Islamic 
nations on genuinely good terms with Israel. Traditionally, Europe's nations have been 
seeking a neutral approach toward Israel so as to not arouse Arab hostility through an 
over appearance offriendliness beyond the factual necessities oftrade. 193 Even the recent 
French and EU initiative to promote peace between Israel and Syria fall into this category 
by demonstrating European "neutrality." 194 Additionally, Turkey has allowed Israel to 
train its air force pilots in Turkish territory. 195 As an independent state, Turkey can do this 
without engendering a significant amount of hostility towards its international intentions. 
If, however, the EU were to extend its military umbrella to the borders oflraq, Syria and 
Iran, these nations could possibly perceive Israeli-Turkish cooperation as being at least 
tacitly supported by the economically powerful EU as well.196 
The problem of borders is not just isolated to the Middle East. Greek-Turkish 
relations, which have long been a NATO problem (and hence an American issue) could 
192 
"Report: Turkey Should Sign Article 5 of WEU Accord," Turkish Daily News, 
http://home.imc/turkey/news/el20195.htm, (1 December 1995). 
193 For a good discussion ofEU initiatives and goals with respect to Israel, Palestine, and the 
Middle East, see Etty. 
194
"Europaische Union sucht mit USA Losung im Nahost-Konflikt", Deutschland Nachrichten, 
(New York: German Information Center, 26 Aprill996), p. 2. 
195 Zafar Bangash, "Turkish-Israel Alliance Worries Neighbors," Muslimedia International, 
http://www.mynet.net/-msanews/MSANEWS/199606/19960614.3.html (as of20 December 1996). 
According to this article, there is apparantly some controversy over whether or not Turkey is actually 
allowing Israeli pilots to train in Turkey. There is no controversy that Israel and Turkey signed an 
cooperation accord in February 1996 as well as a contract for Israel to update 54 Turkish fighter bombers 
at a cost of US $500 million. 
196 According to Etty, the EU is taking pains to ensure there is no Middle East-European 
estrangement. 
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land firmly in the EU and WEU's lap were they to grant Turkish membership. In the 
recent Imia/Kardak Islets stand-off between Greece and Turkey, Europe was not able to 
take decisive action to end the dispute and instead relied on the United States to pull the 
two parties back from the brink of war. 197 This is extremely significant because it shows 
the potential weakness of the WEU and EU. Europeans possibly do not mind having a 
paper-tiger foreign security policy, but they certainly do not want to be directly confronted 
with its reality. 198 A flare-up of real hostility between a Turkey and a Greece within the 
EU and WEU would show the weakness ofMaastricht's Second Pillar. The EU-WEU 
alternative option, to take action, could be equally as odious-Europeans could find 
themselves in the position of having to take a stronger position than the European Union 
political system is capable of. 
2. Greece 
Greece and Turkey share a long animosity dating from the Ottoman period and 
one which was highly instrumental in the founding of modern Turkey. When the Ottoman 
Sultan was forced to accept the conditions ofthe Treaty ofSevres (August 10, 1920) 
which would have dismembered what was left of the Ottoman Empire, the Greek army 
was given responsibility for ensuring Ottoman compliance in Eastern Thrace. Instead 
Greek forces were turned back from Constantinople and eventually were evicted from 
modern-day European Turkey by forces led by Mustafa Kemal. 199 Nonetheless, the 
197 Barber, p. 2. 
198 
"Deputies Fault EU's Handling of Aegean Turmoil," International Herald Tribune, (16 
February 1996), p. 5. "In a resolution, the Parliament, the EU's elected assembly, deplored 'the failure of 
the European Union and its member states in this crisis to take effective action within the framework of 
the common foreign and security policy." 
199 Vali, pp. 30-31. 
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Kemalists were compelled at Lausanne to concede all but the Aegean islands oflmbros 
and Tenedos (Imroz and Bozcaada in Turkish) which lie at the entrance to the Dardenelles 
to Greece, thereby setting up the modern period of conflict with Greece. 200 
a. Aegean Issues 
Territorial issues between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean stem from 
agreements reached at Lausanne ( 1923) between the Turkish government led by the 
Mustafa Kemal and the victorious allies ofWorld War I. In the Aegean region, this 
included giving all but two of the more than 2,000 islands to Greece with their associated 
territorial waters (a three-mile limit at the time, later raised to six for all maritime powers). 
In 1994, based on the UN Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, Greece extended her 
territorial claim to 12 miles, which, if acknowledged, would give her political control of 
71 percent of the Aegean from the original43%. 201 Turkey refuses to recognize this claim 
for several reasons. First, acceptance would deny Turkey access to the Mediterranean 
without passage through Greek "territory. mo2 Second, Greek claims to the continental 
shelf of each island often conflicts with Turkish claims off mainland Anatolia. This is, in 
fact, the heart of the Kardakllmia islands dispute--these two rocky outcroppings of the 
Aegean are located only 3. 8 miles off of the Turkish coast. 203 Finally, oil has been 
discovered off some of the Aegean islands although the quantity is unknown. 204 Since 
200 Vali, p. 31. 
201 
Metz, p. 298. Before Greece changed her claim, they controlled 43% of the Aegean. 
202 Ibid. 
203 
"The Kardak Crisis," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at http://www.turkey.org/ 
kardak.htm (as of 10 December 1996). Note that the European Union backs Greece on the Imia!Kardak 
debate voting 342 to 21 with 11 abstentions on a resolution stating that Parliament was worried by 
"Turkey's dangerous violation of Greek sovereignty." From "Deputies Fault EU's Handling ... ," p. 5. 
204 Metz, p. 55. 
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both countries are energy importers, this is a major point of contention, and one which has 
brought them to the brink ofwar in 1986, 1987, and again in 1995. The dispute over 
Aegean rocks buffets European organizations as demonstrated by problems Europe has 
honoring agreements made between the EU and Turkey as part ofCU.205 
b. Cyprus 
In July 1974, Turkish forces invaded the island of Cyprus to guarantee the 
rights of the Turkish minority population of 18% who feared that Cyprus' Greek 
population (78%--there are 4% "other") was seeking political union with Greece.206 
Ethnic tensions in Cyprus were generally kept under control while the island was 
administered as a British Crown Colony until 1960. With independence came a rise in 
Greek nationalism in particular and the desire by a large percentage of the Greek 
population to seek political union with Greece. In 1964 and again in 1967, Greek 
nationalism led to major crisis between the Greek and Turkish NATO allies. Hostilities 
came to a head in 197 4 when the Greek government caused the overthrow of then-Cyprus 
President Archbishop Makarios III through support of a pro-Greek union group in direct 
violation of the accord which guaranteed Cypriot autonomy and which had been signed by 
Greece, Turkey and Britain in 1960.207 Ultimately, Turkey used Greek violation of the 
205 Caroline Southhey, Karin Hope and Bruce Clark, "Brussel backs Aegean Court Case," 
Financial Times, (22 February 1996, p.3; "Greece Fights EU-Turkey Ties," Financial Times, (25 
November 1996); "Deputies Fault EU's Handling ... ," p. 5; and Philip H. Gordon, "America, the White 
Knight, Should Stop Humiliating Europe, International Herald Tribune, (17-18 February 1996), p. 6. 
206 As of July 1995, the total population of Cyprus was estimated to be 737,000 of which 603,000 
were Greek, and 134,000 were Turks. All population figures are from The World Fact Book 1995, p. llO. 
207 Metz, p. 52. 
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accord as justification for the 20 July 197 4 invasion of Cyprus when they began landing 
forces that would reach a peak strength of 40,000 troops. 
In the ensuing peace talks, a UN buffer zone was agreed to by Greece and 
Turkey as well as the leaders of the Greek and Turkish zones, Glavkov Kliridhis in the 
Greek south and RaufDenktas in the Turkish north. The current EU role in the dispute 
over Cyprus centers on how the island should be governed, when and how it should be 
allowed into the European Union, and whether or not Turkish admission into the EU and 
WEU should be based on resolution of the Cyprus problem. 208 
The Greeks favor returning the Turkish Republic ofNorthern Cyprus 
(TRNC) to the legitimate government of Cyprus which happens to be Greek.209 Turkey 
"remains committed to backing a hi-communal, hi-zonal federal settlement," which would 
formalize the partition of the island into two mostly separate countries. 210 Over twenty 
years later, this remains the situation with the qualification that while Greek Cyprus is 
officially recognized by the world community, the Turkish Republic ofNorthern Cyprus 
(TRNC) is only recognized by Turkey. 
Currently Greece has the upper hand in the EU on the Cyprus issue and has 
successfully introduced a resolution making settlement of the Cyprus issue an essential 
condition for Turkish admission into the EU. 211 The implication is that Greeece will veto 
208 Hi~, 24. 
209 
Turkey is the only country recognizing the independent existence of the TRNC. 
210 
"Foreign Ministry: 'Turkey's Position on Cyprus Unchanged," Turkish Foreign Ministry 
Homepage, http://www.turkey.org/news/0216pol3.htm (as of 26 May 1996). 
211 
Greek Cyprus has per capita GDP of US $12,500, inflation rate of 4.8% and GDP growth rate 
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rate of 63.4% and GDP growth rate of -4% (all figures are for 1994). From The World Fact Book 1995, 
p. 111. 
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eastern EU enlargement if her desires on Cyprus not met. 212 The Greek position was 
further enhanced in 1990 when the EU formally agreed to consider Greek Cyprus' 
admission to the EU. This act has effectively locked in the status quo with respect to any 
EU member vetoing the Greek resolution. This has not changed Turkey's opinion 
regarding Cypriot EU membership. In Turkey's official view, the Cyprus question should 
be resolved before either northern or southern Cyprus can be considered for EU 
membership, and that the Cyprus political situation should have nothing to do with 
Turkish admission into what is essentially an economic entity. 213 Cypriot attitudes differ 
greatly and a reading of the debate between Glavkov K.liridhis, President of the Greek 
Republic of Cyprus, and RaufDenktas ofthe Turkish Republic ofNorthern Cyprus shows 
both sides as intransigent. 214 
Turkey's belief that the EU is primarily an economic polity and that 
therefore her admission should not be predicated on solving the Cyprus situation sounds 
logical, but misses a point about the EU that is becoming ever more clear--being a major 
economic power gives the EU foreign policy clout as well. That fact that the EU is 
factually, if not constitutionally, a political organization is shown not only by the existence 
of a European Union commissioner responsible for EU common and foreign security 
policy, but also in view ofhis role in the Cyprus dispute. The Commissioner, Hans Van 
212 Bruce Clark, "Weapons Build-up Adds Urgency to Cyprus Issue," Financial Times, (4 March 
1996), p. 2. 
213 
"Turkey's Position on Cyprus Unchanged," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at http:// 
www.turkey.org/news/0216pol3.htm, (as of May 1996). 
214 For an example of the intensity of the Cyprus debate among Cypriot leaders, see the 
"conciliatory" letter written by TRNC President RaufDenktas to his Greek Cypriot counterpart, Glafkos 
Clerides in: "Cyprus: 'Full Text Denktas Letter to Kliridhis," (spelling change in original FBIS 
document), Ankara Turkish Daily News in English, (27 September 1996). 
67 
Den Broek, has actively sought to end the Turkish-Greek standoff over Cyprus, and has 
been willing to use relatively strong words to try and influence events by saying that while 
a solution to the Cyprus problem would be preferable before Cypriot accession to the EU, 
it was not an essential precondition. 215 His grounds for negotiating a solution appear 
logical, but they are also substantially vague so that the Greeks have felt it prudent to 
reiterate their view on Cyprus, Turkey and the EU. Van Den Broek: "I don't think that 
for Turkey a situation of maintaining 35,000 troops on Cyprus, having to heavily subsidize 
the economy there and being confronted with constant questions about the unsolved 
dispute ... is an attractive situation." Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos 
"warned against any attempt to use Cyprus' future status as an EU member to blackmail 
Greece into 'submission to aggressive aspirations and schemes' by Turkey."216 
This sentiment is one also shared by Turkey. In the words of Prime 
Minister Yilmaz, "It is time to stop putting pressure on Turkey through the EU."217 
Essentially, the EU is caught in a bind. On the one hand, its citizens expect it to do 
something about the Turkish-Greek dispute while on the other hand it does not seem to 
have the ability to do so. Since Greece is an EU member, she is not subject to the same 
degree of sanctions and coercion as Turkey. 218 Further compounding the EU' s ability to 
manage crisis are conflicting policies. On one hand there is the example ofEU President 
215 
"EU Official Hopeful of Cyprus Solution," Reuters from Lexis/Nexis (2 May 1996). 216 
"EU Official Hopeful .... " 
217 
"Greece: Politicians React to Turkey's Claims on Island," from Athens Athens News in 
English, from FBIS (6 Juen 1996), p. 3. 
218 Technically, the EU is in violation of the Customs Union agreement because Greece has 
blocked Ecu375m ($480m) in EU credits over the Imia (Kardak) islets, a situation which Ireland (who 
currently holds the EU presidency) is pressing to resolve. From "Turkey Heads EU Agenda," Financial 
Times, (25 November 1996), p. 36. 
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Jacques Santer insisting that Greece's borders were fixed and that they were the external 
borders of the EU. 219 Simultaneously there is Greek fiustration that the EU would not 
state as a precondition of the Turco-European Union Association Council meeting that 
"Greek territory is also the territory ofEurope."220 
The ultimate issue for Europeans is not whether they want to be involved 
in the Turkish-Greek dispute, but to what degree. Turkey outside of the EU and WEU 
allows the Europeans to put greater pressure on Turkey but leaves their two key 
organizations closely tied to Greek desires. Because of Turkey's NATO membership, 
barring Turkey from the WEU, in particular, has only symbolic value, but one which is 
irritating to the WEU and the construction of an ESDI. Tansu Ciller, the current Turkish 
foreign minister, has said she will veto the use ofNATO equipment by the WEU as long 
as Greece keeps blocking Turkey's efforts to become a full member of the WEU. 221 
Europeans seem to fear a loss of organizational effectiveness were the 
Turkish-Greek problem fully internalized, but there is some hope for the future if an 
anticipated 1997 United States initiative to re-unite Cyprus succeeds.222 Speculation 
suggests that resolution will involve a "carrot" to both Turkey and Greece--perhaps 
progress of negotiations for EU membership for Turkey, and economic, military and 
ethnic population guarantees for both countries. 
219 
"Greece: Politicians React to ... , p. 3. 
220 Nazlan Ertan, p. not available. 
221 Bruce Clark and Kerin Hope, "Greece Fights EU-Turkey Ties," Financial Times, (25 
November 1996), p. 3. 
222 According to an article in the Financial Times, the United States is planning an "initiative 
early next year to re-unite the island [Cyprus]." From Clark, p. 3. Of course, other initiatives have also 
been started by the U.S. such as in 1985 when talks started on Cyprus' reunification--and broke down. 
From David Barchard, "Little Dialogue on Cyprus Dispute," Financial Times Survey from Lexis/Nexis, 
(20 May 1985), section III, p. V 
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3. Other Countries 
a. Russia 
Russia's influence on Turkish accession to the EU and WEU is surprisingly 
minimal, possibly because she does not see Turkish membership as portending a major 
change in Turkey's current relations with the West, or possibly because she thinks it is too 
unlikely to worry about. 223 This is somewhat surprising given that Russia and Turkey 
appear to be in competition for economic and political influence in Central Asia, the 
Caucasus and the Black Sea as well as over transit rights for energy products in the 
Turkish Straits and attention from Europe. 224 It seems, for example, that Russia's 
periodic attempts to increase her power within the CIS should sound loudly in European 
circles, given Turkey's closeness to Europe and her attempt--based on linguistic, cultural 
and historical ties--to increase her influence in the Turkish CIS republics. 225 Russia, 
however, appears to not be protesting. 226 
223 I could find no example of Russia taking a stance, either pro or con, on Turkey joining the EU 
or WEU. 
224 A mix of articles is needed to identify these areas. Central Asia and Europe--Roland 
Dannreuther, "Russia, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf," Survival, (Winter 1993-94), pp. 92-112; Black 
Sea and Turkish Straits--S. Dolzhikov, "Admiral Baltin on Problems of Black Sea Fleet," from Moscow 
Morskoy Sbornik in Russian, from FBIS, (19 June 1995), pp. 6-9; and the Caucasus and energy--" Ariel 
Cohen, "The New 'Great Game': Oil politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia," The Heritage 
Foundation on the Internet at http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/forpol/bg1065.htrnl (25 January 
1996). Other useful articles and books on a variety of these topics include: Taras Kuzio, "The Crimea 
and European Security," European Security, (Vol. 3, No.4, Winter 1994), pp. 734-774; John W. R. 
Lepingwell, "The Russian Military and Security Policy in the 'Near Abroad'," Survival, (Vol. 36, No. 3, 
Autumn 1994), pp. 70-92; lver Neumann, "Russian Identity in the European Mirror," European Securitv, (Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer 1994), pp. 281-300; and William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth 
or Empire? Russia. Central Asia. and the Transcaucasus, (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hudson Institute, 
1995). 
225 Bernard Lewis, "Rethinking the Middle East," Foreign Affairs from Lexis/Nexis, (Fall, 1992), 
section 3. Of the CIS nations, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan are Muslim. Five of these are Turkish and one, Tajikistan, is Persian. 
226 For a list or bilateral agreements between the two as well as a brief description of Turkish-
Russian foreign policy actions, see "Turkish - Russian Relations," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage at 
http://turkey.org/turkey/Russian.htm, (as of 22 July 1996). 
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A quiet Russia is not a non-existent Russia, however. She still has her UN 
security council seat, a large nuclear arsenal, a large army and a strong desire to halt her 
downward spiral in the international order. 227 Should she desire to send a strong signal on 
Turkish EU and WEU accession, she certainly has the ability to do so as evidenced by her 
posturing against NATO enlargement towards the Baltics. Fortunately for Europe, 
Turkey is already a member ofNATO and Turkish CU did not prompt Russian 
disapproval. EU and WEU diplomats can therefore make a strong case for Turkish 
membership in their organizations, should they choose to do so, since membership would 
not represent a significant change in current European-Russian or Turkish-Russian 
relations. 
b. United State~28 
The United States considers Turkey a key strategic ally, especially given 
the official American disposition towards Iran, Iraq and to a lesser degree, Syria. 229 From 
an American perspective, Turkish EU and WEU membership is to be encouraged for three 
reasons. 23° First is the perceived stabilizing influence membership would have on Turkey 
and on her neighbors. 231 Turkey is viewed as an example of a moderate, secular Islamic 
227 For a consideration of Russian foreign policy options, see Hannes Adomeit, "Russia as a 
'Great Power' in World Affairs: Images and Reality," International Affairs, (Vol 71, No. 1, 1995), pp. 
35-68. 
228 For the relevance in addressing the United States as a European concern, see Richard C. 
Holbrooke, ''America, a European Power, Foreign Affairs, (March!April1995), pp. 38-51. 
229 Lionel Barber and Bruce Clark, "US Polices Aegean 'While EU Sleeps'," Financial Times, (9 
February 1996), p. 2. Quoting President Clinton these authors state, '"More than any other Nato ally, 
Turkey needs to improve its defensive capabilities' in order to 'deter and if necessary combat ... a very 
real missile threat' from Syria, Iran and Iraq." 
230 
"The US put enormous diplomatic e:ffor into ensuring the approval by the European 
Parliament of a Turkey-EU customs accord." From Barber, p. 2. 
231 Lauren E. Bessent, Letter from Staff Assistant to Jesse Helmes on United States relations with 
Turkey, (Washington, DC: 26 February 1996) 
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state that should be supported as an example to other Muslim nations, particularly in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. 232 Second, from a security point ofview, Turkey does not 
have the same geographical immediacy that she does for Europe. Hence the American 
relationship can perhaps be partially understood in terms ofthe attitude, "the enemy of my 
enemy is my friend"--Turkey borders several nations, Syria, Iraq and Iran, with which the 
United States does not enjoy good relations. 233 For the United States, the political cost of 
mildly supporting what Turks profess to want-EU and WEU membership--is low, and 
Europeans have little choice but to pay attention so long as Assistant Secretary of State 
for Canadian and European Affairs Richard Holbrooke's statement that "unless the United 
States is prepared to put its political and military muscle behind the quest for solutions to 
European instability, nothing really gets done" remains true. 234 
This is also related to a third American consideration. Representative 
Barney Frank (Democrat, Massachusetts) first introduced his much-publicized 'Frank 
Amendment' calling for a de facto reduction in American overseas military strength on 
April 1, 1993.235 Part ofthe Frank Amendment purpose was to motivate Europeans to 
assume more responsibility for their own defense. Since Turkey is geographically 
important to the West, it is in American interests to promote Turkish admission into all 
232 Bessent. 
233 Lowell A. Bezanis, "Greece Plans Diplomatic Push Against Turkey," Open Media Research 
Institute, (as of 18 November 1996). Recent of Prime Minister Erbakan's foreign policy inititiatives 
(independent of even his own foreign ministry it should be stressed) to Iran, Libya, Sudan and Nigeria 
have "annoyed Washington." 
234 Gordon, p. 6. 
235 See H.R. 1621; and Jopp, p. 35. 
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European structures in the belief that this would enable Europeans and Turks to better 
take care of themselves. 
B. ECONOMIC 
1. Strategic Location 
Turkey is of vital economic importance to Europe due to her key location astride 
land and sea routes to the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. 
Because Europe has a large economic interest in these regions, she is implicitly involved in 
the foreign policy arena as well. 236 Currently this involvement is largely happening without 
a centrally organized EU strategy as leading European nations carve out their own 
markets in these regions. 237 
Potential trade is a two-way operation, especially with respect to energy issues 
since Europe is energy hungry and Central Asia and the Caucasus have two of the largest 
known oil and gas reserves in the world. 238 For Europe the most important issue with this 
energy wealth is how to best transport conventional energy to its markets. Essentially two 
236 Etty, Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on Relations Between the European 
Union and the Middle East, Lexis/Nexis, (Commission of the European Communities, 13 November 
1995). This article shows EU involvement in the clearly foreign policy arena of Israeli-Palestinian peace 
as well as in promoting regional Middle Eastern security. 
237 The Maastricht Treaty provides for collective action stating it as one of the treaty's goals in 
Title II, Article G, part B, article 3b states, for example, that the European Community activities "shall 
include ... a common commercial policy." Europe is trying to formulate a cohesive economic policy in 
this spirit. See, for example, Etty, Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on Relations Between 
the European Union and the Middle East, Lexis/Nexis, (Commission of the European Communities, 13 
November 1995). 
238 The CIS as a whole, in 1995, had (in billions of barrels) estimated proven oil reserves of 57 
barrels (compared to Saudi Arabia (I) 259; Iraq (2) 100; Iran (5) 89; United States 23; Libya 23; 
and Algeria 9. Estimated gas reserves (in trillions of cubic feet) were CIS (1) 1977; Iraq (10) 109; Iran 
(2) 742; United States (6) 162; Libya (19) 46; and Algeria (8) 128. From Basic Petroleum Data Book, 
(Washington, DC: American Petroleum Institute, Volume XV, No.2, July 1995), Section II, Table 4e and 
Section XIII, Table 7e respectively. 
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primary routes with a variations on the theme are possible--through the Turkish Straits or 
overland via a pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea. 239 
a. Energy Transfer Hub 
Europe uses energy per capita on a scale commensurate with her economic 
status in the world. 240 Maintaining economic prosperity into the next century will require 
the tapping of large new oil and gas resources as the more traditional fields in the Middle 
East and North Africa become less efficient.241 The primary alternative of nuclear energy 
has risen tremendously in political cost, while other possible energy sources such as solar, 
geo-thermal, hydroelectric-electric, wind and tidal are already either fully utilized or 
economically and technologically prohibitive at the present time.242 Accordingly, Europe's 
energy solution in the 21st century could lie at Turkey's borders, in the Caucasus, Central 
Asia, as well in Iraq and Iran. The problem is how to get the oil and gas to Europe. 243 
There are several possible routes as shown in Map 2 (page 78). For 
Caucasian oil, the economically most sensible routes are through Azerbaijan/Iran/Turkey 
(Ankara or Ceyhan), via Azerbaijan/Georgia or through Azerbaijan/Russia. All three have 
limitations from a European perspective. The first one presents diplomatic problems 
because of current American sanctions against Iran as a terrorist nation which are to carry 
239 
Robert V. Barylski, "Russia, The West, and the Caspian Energy Hub," Middle East Journal, 
(Volume 49, No.2, Spring 1995), pp. 217-232. 
240 
On Europe's need for energy, see "The Contribution of Fusion to Sustainable Development," 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authoritv on the Internet at http://www.fusion.org.uk/info/ 
susdev2.htm#Contents (as of 13 December 1996). 
241 
Some analysts argue that alternative energy availability will grow faster than the need for new 
oil, gas and coal fields. See Tom Gray, "Worldwatch Study: Power Surge," http:!nibrary.wustl.edu/-
listmgr/devel-l/Marl995/0024.html, (as of 13 December 1996). 
242 
"The Contribution ofFusion to .... " 
243 See articles by Barylski, Blank. ane Lee. 
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over to any other nation doing business with Iran. However, for Turkey and Europe this 
seems to be only a minor hindrance since neither follows the United States lead in 
sanctions of Iran. A problem in common with the second and third routes is that 
transported oil must be transloaded to oil tankers for shipment through the Turkish Straits. 
For environmental, health and possibly economic reasons, Turkey opposes this, which 
lowers the value of any oil shipped to all but the Black Sea nations. 244 A last problem deals 
with the Russian routes. Presently, all Caucasian oil and gas must pass through Chechnya 
and Grozny ifRussia is to benefit from its production and shipment. Chechnya being a 
break-away republic, it seems highly unlikely that her leadership will allow energy 
shipment to continue as usual for Russia. For Central Asian oil, the best route is 
Kazakhstan/Russia; poorer alternatives are: Kazakhstan/Russia/Georgia, 
Kazakhstan/Turkmenistan!Iran/Turkey and Kazakhstan/Russia/ Azerbaijan/Iran/Turkey. 
Without going into a detailed study of the eventual capacity of the various routes, the 
same general problems prevail. First, the best routes involving Russia pass through 
Grozny and all routes that end at other than a Turkish port must pass through the Turkish 
Straits. There is, of course, the possibility of a pipeline around the Straits, either through 
Bulgaria and Greece or within European or Anatolian Turkey, but this will add 
significantly to the cost due to additional transloading, and pipeline construction and 
maintenance costs. A pipeline going through Turkmenistan, Iran and then Turkey again 
suffers from United States trade sanctions as before, in. addition to being a circuitous 
route. The advantage is that such a route would service most of the Caspian region 
244 See page 82 on the Turkish Straits. 
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Map 2: Energy Transport Routes245 
RUSSIA 
KAZAKHSTAN 
- Existing Oi Pipeline 
-- Existing Products Pipeline 
EGYPT - - - Existing Gas Pipeline 
- • - • Planned Gas Pipeline 
• • • • • • Ptopc>Sod Oi Pipeline 
245 Barylski, p. 227. 
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including heretofore undiscovered deposits of up to 200 billion barrels of oil, which has 
made this region second only to the Persian Gulf in potential. 246 
The basic problem for Europe then, is that all possible routes for export of 
Caucasian and Central Asian oil have suffer from serious political or economic drawbacks. 
Since there is nothing Europe can do about existing national boundaries currently in effect, 
she has to determine the best way of dealing with the geographic realities. Allowing 
Turkey into the EU would probably help this situation somewhat by giving oil investors a 
better idea of what the most politically stable route would be. Additionally, since Turkey 
can stop oil from flowing through the Straits at will, Europe does not have a choice but to 
acknowledge this fact and work with Turkey. Under current market conditions, though, 
this highly speculative reason for allowing Turkey into the EU or WEU is far from 
sufficient to justifY such an action and the real concerns would be based more on time to 
bring new resources to market rather the non-existence of oil. 247 
b. Access to Other Markets 
Europe's major economic dealings with Central Asia, the Middle East, the 
Black Sea region and the Caucasus turn primarily on import of energy and export of 
manufactured goods since these region's economies are often rich although immature. 
Turkey also has strong interests in dealing with these potentially rich markets and is 
246 Lee, Section 16. 
247 New energy resources are continuously being proven despite increasing demand. The United 
States, for example, has has a relatively constant level of proven oil reserves for over 40 years despite 
continuous production in increasing consumption throughout. (25 bbs (billions ofbarrels) in 1950; 32 in 
1960, 30 in 1970, 30 in 1980 and 27 in 1990). World proven reserves, in comparison have gone from 
76bbs in 1950 to 908 bbs, a 14-fold increase in the same period. See Section II, Table 1 "Estimated World 
Crude Oil Reserves Annually as of January 1}, Basic Petroleum Data Book. 
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attempting to gain influence through involvement in multi-national organizations which 
could prove significant competitors and hindrances to European business and political 
interests as they mature. Increasing Turkish influence could have the effect of forcing the 
Europeans to take greater notice of Turkey and become an incentive to let Turkey into the 
EU and WEU, but this is not happening at the present time. 
In the Black Sea region, Turkey is making a strong bid for economic 
primacy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In December 1990, Turkey took the 
initiative in getting Soviet, Rumanian, Bulgarian representatives to actively consider 
establishment of an economic cooperation zone. On 3 January 1992, the Black Sea 
Economic Consortium (BSEC)was formally inaugurated in Istanbut248 Since then six 
former Soviet republics have joined, bringing its membership to ten nations with one 
observer. 249 The organization is primarily trade and investment oriented; it is seen by 
Turkey as a means of increasing its influence in the former Soviet Republics in particular. 
BSEC is important to Turkey because it is the first major international initiative led by 
Turkey in over 50 years, and it gives Turkey a better position as a regional economic and 
possibly as a military power. A strong economic bloc on Europe's eastern boundary could 
pose a threat to European economic interests unless it is properly addressed either by 
248 Graham E. Fuller and Ian 0. Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold 
War," Turkey's New Geopolitics From the Balkans to Western China, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 
1993),p.l03. 
249 BSEC members now include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, 
Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine with Poland having observer status. 
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rendering the BSEC impotent or by treating it as a friendly competitor which can be dealt 
with rationally which appears to be the current path sought by Europe and Turkey. 250 
At the present time there is little for Europeans to fear from the BSEC 
since its effectiveness is more potential than actual, largely due to the highly diverse and 
often antagonistic relationship of its member states towards one another. For Europe, the 
issue is whether or not it wants to more closely associate with this organization and 
perhaps shape it to its economic advantage. 251 At the present time there is no move (or 
reason) to do so and access to the Black Sea States by European business is usually 
conducted without regard to the BSEC. 
Another organization with which Turkey is affiliated is the Economic 
Cooperation Organization (ECO) which Turkey would like to see become influential in 
Central Asia. 252 In a "State of the Union" style press conference on 20 January 1996, 
President Demirel said the BSEC "will help build the bridge between Europe and Asia. 
We also attach importance to the ECO, which has ten members, including the Central 
Asian countries, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. We will continue to develop it."253 The ECO 
250 
"WEU Eyes Black Sea Region," Turkish Press Review from the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
Homepage on the Internet at http:www//mfa.gov.tr/ (4 December 1996). This article says that a document 
prepared jointly by Lale Aytarnan of Turkey and John Hunt of Great Britain and unanimously approved by 
the WEU Parliamentary Assembly said "closer cooperation between Turkey and the WEU on regional 
problems would be beneficial in terms of overall security, and is an approach that should be encouraged 
both by governments that regard themselves as concerned and as by the WEU assembly." 
251 According to the BSEC's Article 6, the BSEC seeks closer ties with other economic 
organizations "such as the EU," another reason the BSEC as presently organized does not worry 
Europeans. From Deniz Akadtil and Semih Vaner, "Die Tiirkei und die neue Runde auf dem Balkan," 
Europaische Rundschau (Summer, 1993), pp. 96. 
252 ECO members include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan with the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" as an 
associate member. 
253 Suleyman Demirel, "News Conference by President Suleyman Demirel at the Cankaya 
Mansion--Live," from Ankarra TRT Television Network in Turkish, translation provided by FBIS, (0800 
GMT, 20 January 1996). 
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was established in 1985 with its headquarters in Teheran and aim of promoting "regional 
cooperation in trade, transportation, communications, tourism, cultural affairs and 
economic development. ,z54 It perhaps has the potential for greater cohesiveness than the 
BSEC since the antagonism among its members does not run as deep. The reality for 
Europeans is that with a headquarters in Teheran, it is an organization that is immediately 
suspect although the Europeans do not have as great a degree of mistrust oflran as their 
American ally. As for the BSEC, there is little reason at present for Europe to be 
concerned about this organization or desire to enhance or modify it. The ECO does, 
however, stand as an example of the importance Turkey places on itself as a bridge nation 
and is clearly part of an overall Turkish strategy to market itself to the west in this role. 
Turkish arguments that they enjoy a privileged position which can 
facilitate Europe trade and influence to the Middle East are weaker than for the Black Sea 
or Central Asia for several reasons. Primary is geography. While Turkey largely controls 
land and sea access to the Black Sea and the Central Asian states, Europe enjoys 
Mediterranean access to Syria, Lebanon and Israel and, through the Suez Canal, with all 
the other Middle Eastern countries. Should there be rapprochement between Iran and 
United States there would be a great expansion ofEuropean ties to Iran as well. Again, a 
look at the geography shows that Turkey's argument that it is a key player in any energy 
transshipment route from Central Asia is largely based on political barriers--it would not 
be significantly more expensive and it would probably be easier politically, to ship Central 
Asian oil through Iran than through either Turkey or Russia. Secondary reasons why 
254 World Fact Book (1995), p. 492. 
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Turkey may not have a major claim to a special relationship with the Middle East are the 
historical and cultural reasons as discussed on pages 35-36. 
c. Turkish Straits 
Europeans must ask themselves if access to the Turkish Straits is a vital 
interest. The answer, short ofwar, is 'yes' which, in fact, was what tilted the NATO 
decision to accept Turkey despite other geo-strategic baggage such as proximity to then-
Russian Caucasus, as well as Iran, and Iraq). 255 The primary issue with European interest 
in the Straits is economic boils primarily down to energy shipment through them. 
On 1 July 1994, Turkey began to subject the passage of oil tankers in 
particular and all large vessels in general to restrictions (see Map 3, page 84).256 Turkey 
has justified this by saying that "[oil tanker shipping] is too risky to be acceptable to the 
255 Vali, p. 152. 
256 
"The Safety of the Turkish Straits," Turkish Foreign Ministry Press Release, http://home.imc 
.netlturkey/releases/050796.htm (Washington, DC, 7 May 1996). 
These restrictions include: 
I. vessels longer than 150 meters (164 yards) are advised to take pilot captains and 
guiding tugs. 
2. automatic pilots for navigation are prohibited. 
3. ships powered by nuclear energy, or carrying nuclear or other hazardous materials 
must report to the Turkish Environment Ministry for permission 
4. Ship height is limited to 190 feet. 
5. New Traffic lanes to be set, new traffic seperation schemes (TSS) are implemented 
6. No more than a single vessel carrying materials deemed hazardous will be allowed to 
pass at the same time. 
7. All ships must notify Turkish authorities 24 hours in advance of intention to pass 
through the straits. 
8. Ships longer than 200 meters can pass only in daytime. 
From "Bosphorus Straits Regulation and Central Asian Oil," Trade and Environment Database 
on the Internet at http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted /BOSPORUS.HTM, (Washington, DC: American 
University, as of 23 October 1996). 
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Turkish government and the public" for environmental and public health reasons should 
there be an accident. 257 The country that takes primary issue with this is Russia, but 
Europeans have a vested interest as well since they receive a lot of the oil that is shipped 
from Russian ports. Additionally, current Turkish policy effectively represents a tariff on 
commerce due to the numerous restrictions. 
Map 3 shows the Turkish Straits are the only sea shipping route into the 
Black Sea for Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Georgia as well as the most practical route 
for oil transshipment from Central Asian States and the Caucasus. Effectively, Turkey has 
a stranglehold on Russian Black Sea commerce should she insist on forcing a Turkish-
Central Asian or Turkish-Caucasian oil pipeline as opposed to the Russian routes. 258 
The status of the Turkish Straits is an issue in which Europeans have been 
involved for a long time--mostly to prevent Russian domination. Notable examples of 
257 
Metin Demirsar, quoting Ahmet Banguoglu, Deputy Director General of Maritime and 
Aviation Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, "Industry's CU Competitiveness Viewed," from Ankara Turkish 
Daily News in English, from FBIS, (1 January 1996). 
Turkey has a very legitimate concern here. Istanbul has a population of 11,000,000 people that 
would be affected by an environmental castastrophe in the Straits and the likelihood of disaster has more 
than a reasonable chance of happening given the amount of shipping that passes through the Straits each 
year. ''By some estimates, as many as 60 ships per day carrying oil and other hazardous materials pass 
through the straits. On the whole, 45,000 ships of various sizes pass, with an average of 1,350 per day. 
On average, 5 ships in excess of80 DWTs (dead weight tons) now pass each day .... Turkish officials 
estimate that 60% of the yearly traffic carries hazardous materials such as natural gas, agriculural and 
other chemicals, oil, nuclear waste and derivatives through the straits. Twenty billion gallons of oil and 
chemicals pass through the straits each year." Additionally, "The straits contain no less than 4 acute 
bends, 2 of them in less than 2 kilometers, at a point where the strait is only 700 meters wide. [sic] 
Between 1988 and 1992 there were 155 collisions in the Bosporus. In March of 1994, the oil tanker 
Nassia ... carrying 19 million gallons of crude oil from Novorssyisk (Russia), suffered 3 of its 10 tanks 
ruptured, and drifted unguided and burning for nearly a week. The accident resulted in $1 billion in 
damages, and the waterway was closed for a week." From "Bosphorus Straits Regulation and Central 
Asian Oil," Trade and Environment Database on the Internet at http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted 
/BOSPORUS.HTM, (Washington, DC: American University, as of23 October 1996). 
258Davit Gunava: "Zurab Zhvania: 'The Black Sea Tragedy Is Our Common Pain,"' in Russian 
from Tbilisi Svobodnaya Gruziya, from FBIS, (17 July 1996), pp. 1-2. 
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European embroilment in Straits affairs are the Treaty ofLondon (1841), Crimean War 
(1854), Russo-Turkish War (1877 when Europe refused to allow Russian domination--
Treaty of Saint Stefano) and World War I with and the secret 1915 Constantinople 
Agreement which would have partitioned the Ottoman Empire and the Straits among 
Russia, Great Britain, France and eventually, ltaly.259 With the creation of the modem 
Turkish state, the International Straits Commission was created as part of the Treaty of 
Lausanne ( 1923) to determine the international status of the passage. This treaty, which 
was largely dictated by the victorious allies, confirmed Turkish ownership, but not 
Turkey's right to control or fortify the passage. 260 
In 1936, Turkey protested the military restrictions and successfully 
petitioned the Montreux Commission for permission to rernilitarize the Straits. World 
War II gave new impetus to a rising Soviet Union to reassert herself in the Straits. In 
1945, Stalin voiced his desire to take possession of the Turkish forts and control the 
259 Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1972), pp. 22-29. Note that the 1915 Gallipoli Campaign had a different motive than blocking 
Russian access to the Straits. 
260 
"Largely dictated" is not the same as "dictated." When Mustafa Kemal consolidated his 
control of modem-day Turkey, the Turkish Assembly adopted the "National Pact" which was to revitalize 
Turkey and garantee it sovereignty over its vital interests to include the Straits under its article 4. Article 
4 also stated that Turkey was willing to negotiate with the allies only so long as Turkish control of the 
Straits was retained. Since the allies agreed to this (with communist Russia not a participant in the peace 
process, the Constaninople agreement was conveniently forgotten), they were able to impose what was 
essentially their agenda on a weak Turkey. From The Turkish Straits and NATO, p. 30; and Alvin Z. 
Rubinstein, Soviet Policy Toward Turkey. Iran. and Afghanistan: The Dvnarnics oflnfluence, (New York: 
Praeger, 1982), p. 5. 
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Straits. This forced Turkey to look westward for guarantees of her territorial integrity, 
prompting the United States to promulgate the so-called "Truman Doctrine" on 12 March, 
1947. Turkey was admitted into NATO in 1952. 
In 1936, Turkey protested the military restrictions and successfully 
petitioned the Montreux Commission for permission to remilitarize the Straits. World 
War II gave new impetus to a rising Soviet Union to reassert herself in the Straits. In 
1945, Stalin voiced his desire to take possession of the Turkish forts and control the 
Straits. This forced Turkey to look westward for guarantees of her territorial integrity, 
prompting the United States to promulgate the so-called "Truman Doctrine" on 12 March, 
1947. Turkey was admitted into NATO in 1952. 
The year 1991 brought about new opportunities for Turkey. The Soviet 
Union became the CIS, creating a regional economic, political and military power vacuum. 
Most important was the economic opportunity. Although Turkey is not a rich state by 
Western European standards, she is well off and dynamic compared to the nations of the 
CIS. The result has been an opportunity to use the Straits strategically which Turkey has 
done willingly and carefully. The result is European and American support of Turkey's 
increased restrictions on commerce in the Straits despite Russia's efforts to have Turkey 
revert to the more liberal pre-1994 policy. 262 
The advantage for Europeans if Turkey were allowed into the EU is a 
probable guarantee that their oil and other commerce would get through to Europe--either 
by ship via the Bosporus or pipeline through Turkey. The disadvantage concerns issues of 
262 Lee states that Turkey's legal basis for modifying the treaty was a successful petition to the 
International Maritime Organization, which has links to the U.N. 
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foreign policy. With the present situation Europe already enjoys all the commercial access 
she needs without experiencing potential military or political negatives. Additionally, with 
the status quo, Europe has not excluded Russia as a potential energy partner and the 
possibility continues to exist that, despite Chechnya, a northern pipeline route is developed 
for Central Asian oil, if not for Caucasian oil. 
Given historical Russian animosity towards the Turkish position on the 
Straits and the fact that Turkey, even without European backing, is operating from a 
position of strength in the Straits and the Black Sea as a whole, there is more than a little 
reason for European wariness with respect to arousing Russian jealousies and perhaps 
animosities. 263 In the dispute with Russia over oil, Turkey, with the Bosporus, is said to 
control the "entrance hall" while Russia "holds the house" to Caspian Asia.Z64 This factor, 
though, has been more useful in gaining support for oil pipelines transiting Turkey than in 
gaining closer official ties to the EU and WED. 265 
263 For Russian animosity to Turkish restrictions on Straits commerce, see Lee; Igor Kasatonov, 
"Kasatonov Interviewed on Retaining Black Sea Fleet," from Moscow Moskovskaya Pravda in Russian, 
translation provided by FBIS, (18 October 1995), p. 2; Oleg Myasnikov, "Russia Alleges Ukraine Could 
Not Afford Black Sea Fleet," from Sevastopol Flag Rodiny in Russian, translation provided by FBIS, (5 
September 1995), p. 3; "Russia: Turkey Blamed for Damaging Bosporus Ecology," Moscow 
Kommersant-Daily in Russian, from FBIS, (22 May 1996), p. 4; and Marcus Hopkins, "Environmental 
Risks of Oil Transported Through the Bosphorus," Azergaijan International, (Autumn, 1995) from the 
Internet at http://www.azer.com/3.3environmental. html, (as of23 October 1996). 264 Rubinstein, pp. 5-6. 
265 Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations Concerning Persian 
Gulg Security in the Post-Cold War Era: 1989-1995," Middle East Journal, (Volume 50, No. 3, Summer 
1996), p. 355. Aykan says, "Ifthis (Caspian) oil was exported via Turkey, Europe's dependence on 
Turkey would make the Europeans more aware of that country's continuing strategic importance to the 
West in the post-Cold War era. This awareness should in tum contribute to Eruopean approval for the inclusion of Turkey as a full member in the European Union." 
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2. Competitiveness 
In 1995, Turkey was the EU's lOth largest trading partner doing a total of more 
than US $20 billion in trade, all of it non-oil. 266 In 1996, expectations are that Turkey will 
move into seventh place, ahead ofPoland and behind Russia. 267 John Barham, the primary 
writer on Turkey for the Financial Times, says "International companies cannot afford to 
ignore Turkey. [sic] It has a young urbanizing population .... Penetration rates for 
consumer products ranging from credit cards or washing machines are well below 
European levels ... [and] ... it is located at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East 
and central Asia."268 CU reflects this ideology. Turkey has "die dynamischste Wirtschaft 
der ganzen Region,"--the most dynamic economy in the entire region. From 1989 to 1994 
Turkey's increase in GNP was 36.4 percent compared to 6.9 percent for Greece and she 
has undertaken to greatly reduce government restrictions on international business 
opportunities within Turkey. 269 Additionally, in both 1996 and 1997, she is expected to 
have a GNP growth of8.1 percent. 270 Presented with this kind of growth and a 
commitment to reform, the number of foreign firms beginning business operations in 
Turkey jumped from 100 in 1979, to over 2,000 in 1991 with a corresponding change in 
capitalization of US $225 million in 1979 to US $6 billion in 1992.271 In 1986, the 
266 Alejandro V. Lorca Corrons and Mehmet Ali Ciftci, "Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area of 
the European Union: Utopia or Reality?," Turkish Daily News at http://home.imc.net/turkey/news/ 
el20195.htm, (1 Dec 1995). 
267 David Tonge, "The Honeymoon Quest," Financial Times Survey, (6 December 1996), p. II. 
268 Barham, p. I. 
269 Deniz Akadtil and Semih Vaner, "Die Ttirkei und die neue Runde auf dem Balkan," 
Europaische Rundschau (Summer, 1993), pp. 89. The authors were primarily referring to the Balkan 
region when they made this remark. 
270 John Barham, "A Perpetual State of Quasi-Crisis," Financial Times Survey. (6 December 
1996), p. III. 
271 Ibid. 
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Istanbul stock market was opened and today it is the region's most vibrant, encompassing 
almost all major and medium-sized firms doing business in the Balkans, the Middle East 
and Central Asia. 272 
Despite these significant indicators of success there are severe misgivings about the 
future of the Turkish economy as well. John Barnam also says: 
Growth has averaged just 4 percent between 1990-95, a mediocre 
performance given population growth of just under 2 percent. Public 
finances are collapsing - interest payments on the government's debts will 
probably consume nearly two thirds of revenues next year - and with them 
the state's ability to provide basic services. Blackouts have become a 
feature of daily life. [sic] The economy is not creating enough jobs - urban 
unemployment is worsening, particularly among the young. Society is 
becoming divided between haves and have-nots and between secularists 
and Islarnists. "273 
The implication is that the Turkish economy is not ready for unrestricted trade on 
the EU model although this is a now a moot point given that CU effectively has brought 
Turkey into the EU as an economic, but non-voting partner. 274 Generally, Turkish 
business looked forward to CU, especially if the textiles, tourism, banking, construction 
industries and agriculture. 275 Automotive and electronics industries were mostly opposed 
to it. 276 Also, larger firms were less fearful than smaller firms which suffered 
disproportionately from the 5 April 1994 tax rises and contraction of GNP and who have 
272 Barham, "Designs on Neighbors," Financial Times Survey, (6 December 1996), p. VI. This 
article contains a summary of information pertinent to the stock exchange. 
273 Barham, p. I. 
274 Manisali, chapter IV. Professor Manisali is against CU because it obligates Turkey to take 
domestic and foreign policy actions that are determined by the EU without Turkey having a right to vote 
on them herself. His article represents an extreme view of CU implications for Turkish sovereignty, but 
other authors, such as Hie;: and Kramer agree with him in spirit if not in vehemence. 275 Hic;:,p.l7. 
276 Ibid. 
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requested assistance?77 Finally, their seems to be a tacit recognition that the black 
economy plays a major role in countering the appearance of Turkish economic instability 
as it may be 30-50 percent ofthe official economy. 278 
Due to CU, the problem of Turkish competitiveness is one Europeans and Turks 
have to deal with immediately, as according to the CU Treaty, Turkey has only five years 
to meet or have waived, the economic policies of the EU. Europe and Turkey both 
recognized the costs of compliance would be high as shown by the EU promising US $3.2 
billion in aid over the five year period beginning 1 January 1996, while Turkey expects to 
lose US $2.4 billion per year in certain tax revenues. 279 
Customs Union has created all the de facto economic trappings of Turkish EU 
membership (minus the right to vote), but the ultimate goal ofEuropean leaders with 
respect to CU remains unclear. While it is true that the CU treaty is a document of great 
import to Turkey in particular, it is noteworthy that it does not make any promises on EU 
membership. Significantly, nowhere does the CU Treaty specifically state that the end 
result ofCU is EU membership. Rather, CU "will complete the transitional phase" ofthe 
1963 Ankara Agreement and that CU "represents an important qualitative step, in political 
and economic terms."280 
277 Hi\:, p. 18. To counter small business concerns, the EU is trying to assist with programs to 
support small and medium enterprises (SEMS). From Tonge, "The Honeymoon Quest," p. II. 
278 John Barham, "A Perpetual State of Quasi-Crisis," Financial Times Survey, (6 December 
1996), p. III. 
279 Hi\!, p. 22. These figures may be dated as Turkey believes total aid will total US $3.2 billion. 
From "Economic Changes Following CU," Turkish Foreign Ministry Homepage, http://www.turkey.org/ 
news/o216po5.htm, (as ofMay 1996). Hi\!'s figures do not include possible gains in tax revenues due to 
increased trade. 
280 
"Text of Decision No 1/95 (Customs Union) ... ,"Preamble. 
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3. Population Growth 
Germany probably is most cognizant ofthe Turkey due to the large Turkish 
expatriate population currently living in Germany. 281 Originally invited as Gastarbeiter, 
(guest workers) to work in low-paying, low social position jobs during Germany's 1960s 
economic miracle, many of them have stayed. Unlike other Gastarbeiter, such as East and 
South Europeans, they have not assimilated, even after several generations. Part of this is 
due to their background-they tend to come from among the least-educated and culturally 
conservative of Turks. A product ofthis conservatism and backwardness has been the 
growth of Turkish ghettos where their alienation continues to feed upon itself Another 
characteristic ofthe Turkish Gastarbeiter is the high percentage ofKurds among them, 
estimated to be around 25 percent. This group came not only for work, but also to escape 
Turkish persecution. Unfortunately for Turkish prospects for admission to the EU and the 
WEU, this group in particular, but a significant minority of all Turks in Germany, has 
carried their old animosities to Germany. Gastarbeiter insularity coupled with ethnic 
issues has created a disenfranchised group hostile to both Bonn and Ankara, that is willing 
to demonstrate their dissatisfaction in undemocratic ways. Recent examples include the 
PKK's threat to murder high German officials, including Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, 
and the more general blocking of Autobahns and other disruptions.282 
281 German sources estimate there are 2,014,000 Turks currently living in Germany, from "In 
Deutschland Ieben soviele Auslander wie nie zuvor - Bevolkerungsteil knapp neun Prozent", Deutschland 
Nachrichten, (New York: German Information Service, 12 April1996), p. 1. 
282 
"PKK droht mit Gewalt und Anschlagen- Verschiirfte Sicherheitsma.Bnahmen", Deutschland 
Nachrichten (New York: German Information Center), p. 1; "Kurdische Extremisten inszenieren Terror 
und Gewalt- Politiker fordem umgehende Abschiebungen", Deutschland Nachrichten, (22 March 1996), 
p. 1. 
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Another concern of Germany in allowing Turkish full membership in the WEU and 
EU is the implicit opening up ofborders to free immigration. Germans as well as other 
Europeans see this as a major threat to an already over taxed welfare system as well as a 
possible cause of upheaval among the already unemployed.. It is feared by Germany and 
other EU nations that Turkey, with the second largest population in Europe as well as the 
fastest growing population could overwhelm Western Europe with a flood of immigrants. 
High population growth per se is not a problem, but Turkey also has a high level of 
unemployment. 283 Until Turkey's birth and unemployment rates are brought more into line 
with that of Europe in general, Europeans are highly unlikely to allow Turkey full EU 
membership and consequently, full partnership in an ESDI. 
C. DEMOCRATIC TRADITION: HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE OF LAW AND 
THE KURDS 
Human rights issues in Turkey are closely tied to the Kurdish problem since most 
alleged violations involve this minority group. Nonetheless is it is also important to speak 
of European concerns about Turkish adherence to human rights principles separate from 
the Kurdish issue so as to understand how the dual dynamic ofKurds and human rights 
interact. 
Europeans have two major concerns with Turkish human rights: violations of the 
rule of law as laid out in the Turkish constitution, and those of agreements already signed 
between Turkey and European organizations284 The Maastricht Treaty identifies European 
283 Kuniholm, p. 41. 
284 Both the CofE and CU agreements include clauses promoting democracy and human rights. 
The WEU treaty more properly known as the Brussels Treaty which was signed in Paris on 23 October 
19 54 (Turkey is an Associate Member of the WED and hence not a signatory to the actual treaty) says in 
in its preamble: "[The High Contracting Parties] Resolved: To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human 
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concerns most directly when it states in Title V, Article J.1.2 that "the objectives ofthe 
common foreign and security policy shall be ... to develop and consolidate democracy 
and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. nz85 It is not 
Turkey's stated goals with respect to human rights that Europeans have a problem with, 
rather it is perceived Turkish non adherence to their own principles. 286 Indeed her 
constitution specifically states " ... it is the birthright of every Turkish citizen to lead an 
honorable life and to develop his material and spiritual resources under the aegis of 
national culture, civilization and the rule of law, through the exercise of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Constitution in conformity with the requirements of 
equality and social justice." Further, "The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and 
social State governed by the rule oflaw; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, 
national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of 
Atattirk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble. 287 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of 
the United Nations; To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political 
liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule oflaw, which are their common heritage;" etc. From 
Western European Union Brussels Treaty on the Internet at gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int/00/ 
Other_lnternationaVweu!BASIC/weul (23 Oct 1954). The Washington Treaty founding NATO states in 
its preamble, "The Parties to this Treaty ... are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage 
and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of 
law," from NATO Handbook, p. 231. 
285 The Maastricht Treatv on the Internet at http://www.cec.lu/en/recordlmt/top.html (I 
November 1993). 
286 The list articles expressing Turkey's goals could be endless. See "Turkey: Demirel Coments 
on Foreign Policy Issues," Ankara Turkish Daily News in English from FBIS, (15 March 1996); "The 
Goals and Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy,"; "Interview with Turkey's Foreign Minister Deniz 
Baykal," Turkish Foreign Ministrv Homepage at http://www/turkey.org/news/0216p09.htm, (as of May 
1996); and "Germany: Turkey's Yilmaz Addresses Konrad-Adenauer Foundation," Ankara TRT 
Television Network in Turkish by FBIS (2100 GMT, 17 May 1996). 
287 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Preamble and Article 2 from the Internet at 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ grupi/Anayasalil42.htm, (1982). 
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The question, then, is why so many European observers of Turkey question 
Turkey's human rights actions. 288 Primary concern for Europeans lies in part Two 
(Fundamental Rights and Duties), especially Chapter One, Articles 13, 14 and 15 ofthe 
Turkish Constitution. A reading between the lines shows clearly that the nation reserves 
tremendous power at the expense of the individual--even in times that are not what could 
be described as a "national emergency."289 This produced the situation, as discussed 
earlier, whereby eight members of the Turkish Parliament were arrested and subsequently 
stripped of their official status for alleged violations ofthe constitution in 1994. The 
European Parliament responded to the arrests by saying that Turkey should "recognize the 
288 Books include, Metz, p. 296 (and others); Fuller, pp. 109-110; and Ahmad, pp. 213-227. 
Articles include: Hiy, pp. 27-34; Kramer, pp. 7-8 and Kuniholm, pp. 44-45. 
289 Article 13: Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by law, in conformity with the 
the letter and spirt of the Constitution, with the aim of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State 
with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national security, public order, general 
peace, the public interest, public morals and public health, and also for specific reasons set forth in the 
relevant Articles of the Constitution. General and specific grounds for restrictions of fundamental rights 
and freedoms shall not conflict witht he requirements of the democratic order of society and shall not be 
imposed for any purpose other than those for which they are prescribed. The general grounds for 
restriction set forth in this article shall apply for all fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Article 14. None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with 
the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, of endangering the 
existence of the Turkish State and Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms, of placing the 
government of the State under the control of an individual or agroup of people, or establishing the 
hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, 
religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and 
ideas. The sanctions to be applied against those who violate these prohibitions, and those who incite and 
provoke others to the same shall be determined by law. No provision of this Constitution shall be 
interpreted in a manner that would grant the right of destroying the rightys and freedoms emvodied in the 
Constitution. 
Article 15. In times of war, mobilisation, martial law, or state of emergency, the exercise of 
fundamental rights and freedoms can be partially or entirely suspended, or measures may be taken, to the 
extent required by the exigencies of the situation, which derogate the guarantees embodied in the 
Constitution, provided that obligations under international law are not violated. Even under the 
circumstances indicated in the first paragraph, the individual's right to life, and the integrity of this 
material and spiritual entity shall be inviolable except where the death sentence has been decided upon; no 
one may be compelled to reveal his religion, conscience, thought or opinion, nor be accused on account of 
them; offences and penalties may not be made retroactive, nor may anyone be held guilty until so proven 
by a court judgement. From Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. 
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right of autonomy of the Kurdish people .... "290 The heart of this case to both Europeans 
and Americans is Turkey's refusal to recognize the Kurds as a legal minority. United 
States Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Oxman said in response to the arrests and 
specifically about Turkey and the Kurds, "We also believe that a lasting solution to the 
problems in the southeast cannot be achieved through purely military means. We believe 
that non-military civil and social solutions must be pursued .... "291 It also appears that the 
United States also put pressure on the EU to assist in a multilateral solution through 
increased pressure for CU since clauses of the CU treaty deal directly with human rights. 
The issue of minority rights also affects Turkey's relationship with the Council of 
Europe. On 10 November 1994, the Committee of Ministers adopted a Framework 
Convention for the Protection ofNational Minorities based on the Vienna Summit of9 
October 1993.292 Turkey has refused to sign believing that to do so would amount to 
official recognition of her Kurdish minority population even though the Framework rights 
involved are individual rights, and not collective or group rights. 293 Turkey's reticence on 
this fairly straight forward document only increases European doubts as to Turkey's real 
commitment to human rights concerns despite her words to the contrary. 
The reason for European interest and condemnation is the scale of suffering. 
Figures are often in dispute, but Turkish numbers include the following. Between 1984 
and 1993, 2,380 civilians and 3,320 security personell were killed by the PKK and there 
290 
"Ankara Hits Back ... " 
291 Ibid. 
292 Anders Ronquist, "The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities," from the Internet at gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int/OO/Other_International/ 
csce!HM/1995/ARTICLES/ronquistl.txt, (no date given, as of20 November 1996). 
293 Ronquist. 
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were a total of 10,879 "terrorist events." The same article also reports that schools and 
teachers were specially targeted and between 1987 and 1993, 253 "educational 
institutions" were fully or partially burned by the PKK and that 138 teachers and religions 
personnel were killed or wounded. 294 
A different report offerin figures on Kurdish suffering, both at government and 
PKK hands are also staggering, and the numbers are disputed. Approximately 1,000 
Kurdish villages were burned, destroyed or evacuated by Turkish forces through 1994 
creating 1.4 million evacuees and refugees. The same report also says 11,000 civilians 
were killed by Turkish forces during the same period and that in 1994 alone, around 
350,000 soldiers were deployed against the PKK.295 
Victims of Turkey's internal war since 1994 are also high and the PKK' s ability to 
keep themselves in the media, often in a positive light, has been excellent. European 
concerns over Turkish human rights violations extend to law enforcement and the penal 
system. One source states that between 1991 and 1995 there were "2,000 extrajudicial 
executions and daily reports of torture during custody."296 The result ofthis negative 
press is shown in polls ofEuropean citizens, with fewer than 20 percent rating Turkey 
"democratic" and over 50 percent saying she was "undemocratic."297 
Turkish dealings with the PKK can only be called repressive. 298 It is also true that 
the Kurdish question remains disturbingly persistent and that Europeans will have to come 
294 
"PKK: Reality in Turkey .... " 
295 Hepburn, p. C5. 
296 Kurkr;:u, p. 7. 
297 See Appendix B, Table Bl4c. 
298 Every story has two sides and this is a clear example. There is no doubt to Europeans that the 
PKK is a terrorist organization as evidenced by their denouncement in 1993. Neither is the PKK a 
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to even closer grips with all the problems engendered by the Kurds if they bring Turkey 
into the EU and WEU. 299 What many Europeans forget, however, is that the British 
Prevention of Terrorism Act "is precisely as draconian as those ofthe 'Struggle Against 
Terrorism Law' in Turkey."300 
D. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
This is a highly controversial issue which neither Europeans nor Turks seem 
willing to squarely face. Robert Mauther, a diplomatic correspondent for the EU perhaps 
stated European reservations most clearly when he wrote, " ... Turkey [should] look facts 
in the face on the European issue and [sic] search for other more deep-seated reasons than 
the ones officially given for Western Europe's coolness towards Turkey, namely a feeling 
of cultural and religious incompatibility."301 His implicit assumption is that regardless of 
what the Turkish Constitution says about Turkey being a secular state, it does not change 
the fact that 99 percent ofTurks believe in Islam just as the majority ofEuropeans believe 
in Christianity302 This is not an issue of extremism--indeed the Turks are considered 
moderate practitioners oftheir religion: "Their [Turk's] religion is an integral part of their 
culture and significant in an individual's life primarily as a framework for rites of passage. 
synonom for the Kurds and in fact most Kurds have nothing to do with the organization if they can help it 
(Henze in Fuller, pp. 21-27). PKK terrorists routinely use extortion, torture and other forms of coercion to 
influence both Kurds and Turks (Germany: PKK Defectors Descibe Party Structure). For the official 
view of the PKK, see PKK: Realitv in Turkey and in the World, (Ankara: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti 
Yayinlari, February 1994). 
299 Kfirkr;fi, p. 8. 
300 Ronnie Marguiles, "Turkey and the European Union," Middle East Report, (Spring, 1996), p. 
27. 
301 Robert Mauthner, "Misunderstandings Persist," Financial Times Survey from Lexis/Nexis, 
(20 May 1985), p. IV. 
302 Fuller, p. 5. The Turkish Constitution, Article 2 states, in part, "The Republic of Turkey is a 
democratic, secular and social state ... " From the Internet at 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupi/ Anayasa!i 142.htm. 
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[sic] Only Western alarmists unfamiliar with the quality and tempo ofTurkish life could 
regard these [daily rituals, ubiquitous prayer chapels, even increased mosque building] as a 
manifestation ofMuslim fundamentalism. 00303 To Mr. Mauther the issue is more benign, 
but no less important to both Turks and Europeans. "Are the values, ideals and historical 
perceptions of Turkey and Western Europe sufficiently similar to permit the integration of 
the two?"304 
1. Tolerance and Intolerance 
Turkey does tremendous business with the Middle East and North Africa, 
primarily as an exporter of technology products and as an importer of energy products. 
Were Turkey to gain full EU membership, Europeans could expect some increased (but 
unknown) access to Islamic markets through the good offices of Turkey assuming she is 
also on good terms with the objective nations. This is based on assumptions arising from 
the "bridge" nation concept, namely that European acceptance of Turkey would be 
perceived as a positive signal of tolerance and even support of other cultures. It seems 
likely that Turkish membership in the EU would have this affect on the Turkish Central 
Asian states more than the Muslim states of the Middle East, but it is also likely that the 
effects would be minimal. The main reason is that these other nations already participate 
in the international economy and are no more likely to give a special deal to Europeans 
because of Turkey than Europeans are to give a special deal to Canada or the United 
States. If Europeans expect increased benefits due to a demonstration that the EU is not a 
"Christian club" they are probably incorrect. 
303 ibid. 
304 Mauther, p. IV. 
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2. Export Stability 
The main expectation Europeans have should Turkey become a full member of the 
EU and WEU is the promotion of stability in the countries surrounding Turkey. This 
would be accomplished through vindication of Atatiirk's legacy as well by making Turkey 
"an important model to those Muslim nations in the Middle East that contemplate what it 
means to be a secular, democratic republic."305 
If Europe takes the opposite path and formally tells Turkey not to expect entrance 
in the foreseeable future, a possible repercussion is resentment for the short term with 
problems, possibly major, over the long term. Two major possibilities exist, one of which 
appears to be happening already. That is increasing Turkish autonomy in foreign and 
economic policy formulation in opposition to European interests as already discussed. 
The other is increased Turkish and regional instability based on the assumption that ifEU 
membership could bring about stability, then the opposite action should have the opposite 
affect. There is clearly an undercurrent of resentment even now (although somewhat 
ameliorated by CU among pro-EU Turks). 306 But ifEurope does not answer the door 
often enough, Turkey may eventually get the message that she is not wanted as an equal 
partner. Should a sufficient level of dialogue remains in effect, this may not pose an 
insurmountable problem (i.e., continued benefits oflirnited EU membership such as 
customs union as well as loans and grants). If Turkey does not believe that there is 
305 Kuniholm, p. 48. 
306 Turkey has been disappointed when the European Council of Ministers refused to open 
negotiations on Turkey's 1987 request for EEC accession until at least 1993, somewhat ameliorating 
Turkish disappointment by calling for CU by 1995 instead. (Kuniholm, pp. 41-43) 
98 
sufficient dialogue, she will be forced to behave in a much more independent nation with 
negative effects for the EU, the WEU and NAT0. 307 
For the EU and WEU, Turkish bilateralism outside ofEuropean constructs means 
that Turkey may thwart, either intentionally or inadvertently, Europe's ability to export 
stability to the Middle East, Black Sea nations, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Among 
problems Europe could expect are reduced access to markets, increased transit fees, 
undermining of European initiatives in the Turkish sphere of influence and increased 
immigration from Turkey due to a worsening of the human rights situation there. 308 
More likely is that Turkey will demonstrate increased autonomy in her sphere of 
influence by such actions as her leadership in the formation of the BSEC which is an 
economic arrangement often nations-Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. 309 At the time of its formation, the West, 
to include Europe in particular, hoped that it would also be a means to funnel aid to the 
new republics and optimistically influence their democratization, but at a minimum, that it 
307 Ronald D. Asmus on page 40 in the chapter "Western Europe" of Strategic Apraisal 1996, 
(Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1996), edited by Zalmay Khalilzad, believes this has already 
happened. "The potent combination of radical Islam, trends toward proliferation, and the uncertainty of 
traditional pro-western pillars, such as Turkey, produced enormous strategic uncertainty (for Western 
Europe)." It is significant that he considers Turkey both in and outside of Europe. On page 44 Asmus 
says, "While one group of countries led by Germany remains primarily concerned with the East, France, 
Italy, Spain and Turkey are first and foremost concerned about national security concerns in the South." 
See, also, Kuniholm, p. 43. 
308
"Turkey and Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)" from the Internet, 
( 18 May 1996). This assumes that exclusion from the EU and WED would have an adverse affect on the 
Turkish economy which would, in tum, worsen population pressures on Turkey's government and 
economy. 
309Ziya Onis, "Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search ofldentity," Middle East Journal, 
(Vol 49, No. 1, Winter, 1995), p. 58. 
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would create a fertile trade environment with this resource-rich region. Forcing Turkey to 
be overly independent could deny Europe these potential benefits. 
Too much of a slowdown in EU and WED progress towards membership could 
also have adverse affects on NATO which appears to have been part of the reason behind 
American pressure on the EU to attain CU with Turkey. In short, Europe must be 
absolutely certain not to send too much of a negative signal to Turkey which would in turn 
cause a spiraling decline in relations to a level significantly poorer than they currently are 
with strong repercussions in the economic realm. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Turkey has had European Union membership as a written goal since 1963, and 
Western European Union membership as a goal since 1987. Progress has been made, 
most recently with Customs Union and Associate Member status respectively, but many 
Turkish leaders are continuing the push for full membership in both organizations as the 
logical consequence ofKemalism. 
Europe also recognizes Turkey's goal of eventual full membership, but is unwilling 
to make a firm commitment. Europeans do not question that Turkey is extremely 
important to them. Whether Turkey is important enough to become part of part ofthe EU 
and WEU is open for debate. 
Many Turkish leaders cite cultural differences as the real basis ofEuropean apathy 
in supporting Turkey's bid for membership. Investigation of the public evidence suggests 
this may be a factor, but not necessarily the most important one. Other commonly-
mentioned reasons include issues of economics and population growth, human rights and 
foreign policy. CU has served to make economic concerns less important by bringing 
about all the economic appearances ofEU membership. CU has also served to focus 
attention on the other three European issues and one highlighted a peculiarly Turkish one-
-sovereignty. 
As part of the CU Treaty, Turkey has promised to improve her human rights 
record, work to find a solution to the Kurdish question, and cooperate on ending the 
Cyprus and Aegean stand-off with Greece. Many Turks takes issue that this is mandated 
by an organization in which they do not have full voice, namely, the right to vote. Hence, 
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Turks see themselves in a situation whereby policy ofthe 15, including nemesis Greece, is 
forced on them against their will--even on issues they perceive as mostly internal such as 
enforcement ofTurkish law. 
Europeans are likewise saddled with responsibilities arising from CU--especially to 
ensure it does not fail. Although the CU treaty does not specifically mention future 
Turkish integration into the EU, it is strongly implied. Further, CU is seen by both sides 
as a rehearsal of what EU membership would mean for them. Failure of CU, then, would 
be a failure in several ways. For Turkey, failure would demonstrate to her leaders and 
people alike that full integration into Europe is a dead-end path. For Europe, failure could 
diminish the current ties she has to a very important trading partner as well as a 
strategically-positioned nation. 
Europeans and Turks may ask why failure to enter the EU and WEU is important 
in the first place. The primary reason is stability--within Turkey, the regions surrounding 
her and even Europe itself Although Europeans do not overwhelmingly espouse Turkish 
membership in their most important organizations, they almost universally believe that 
regional stability, broadly defined to include all of the Eurasian land mass (and Africa), is a 
vital interest. Exporting stability to Turkey and her neighbors is commonly cited as a 
major benefit of allowing Turkey into the EU and the WEU. Europeans know this but 
they do not, from a Turkish perspective, seem to realize that failure to say "yes" to 
accession often enough begins to sound like "no." 
European failure to take a forthright position on Turkish accession is due largely to 
the size of the organization and the divergent interests of its members. Turkish leaders 
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seems cognizant ofthis fact which goes far in understanding 33 years of patience. As 
Europe "deepens," though, she is seen as much more monolithic and centralized to 
outsiders and partial outsiders such as Turkey. 
The political and economic consequences for Europe of not allowing Turkey full 
EU and WEU membership over the near term (5-10 years) are probably quite low. Over 
the medium and long term adherence to the status quo of having Turkey near, but not in, 
involves increased risk to Turkish and possibly European stability unless European and 
Turkish leaders take appropriate actions to accommodate a situation different from each 
polities' stated goal ofmembership. 
Many European leaders fail to realize is that their 'near term' is Turkey's 'present.' 
European leaders are still behaving as ifbipolar assumptions remain valid--most 
importantly that Turkey will remain relatively cooperative and supportive regardless of 
European complacency. The reality is that two key events serve to modify this 
assumption--the end of the Cold War, and the beginning of the Second GulfWar. Prior to 
the Second Gulf War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, Turkey did not have a great 
deal oflatitude with respect to choosing her allies. The Second GulfWar and the 
reluctance ofNATO's European allies to honor, without reservation, their Article 5 
guarantees indicated to Turkish leaders that they should consider looking further for 
security guarantees. The end of the Soviet Union enabled them to do this. 
The result it that since 1991, Turkey has been much more willing to develop her 
foreign policy independent of Europe. Forming the BSEC, supporting the ECO, working 
bilaterally with the United States, and making overtures to neighboring powers, regardless 
103 
of their diplomatic status with respect to Europe (and the United States) are 
demonstrations of this increasing independence. Currently this is not a major problem as 
Turkey is still willing to explore options with Europe. 
There are three options available to Turkey. She can completely renounce the goal 
ofEU and WEU membership and all the treaties and agreements she has signed with the 
EU and WEU until now. She could continue whole-heartedly to clamor for membership. 
Or she can do as she is presently doing; that is, maintain a dialogue while pursuing other 
options simultaneously. 
Europeans do not seem to realize that Turkey is, in fact, following a different 
paradigm of relations since they remain focused on the appearances of closer ties that CU 
engender. Additionally, the change in the paradigm may not be important now because a 
true ESDI is still in the future, hence Turkish membership in NATO is sufficient to meet 
European security needs--with the comfortable knowledge that the United States is also 
there should there be a situation involving Turkey. 
Europe's greatest challenge in not letting Turkey in will be keeping the door open 
to all the benefits she currently gets from her Turkish dealings. The Black Sea Economic 
Consortium may not be particularly effective, but when one is aware ofwhat it, the 
Economic Cooperation Organization and Ozal's, Demeril's, Cillar's and Erbakan's 
initiatives abroad, one can clearly see a new trend in Turkish foreign policy. This trend of 
cooperative and friendly overtures by Turkey could help Europe, but it could also be 
detrimental depending how Turkey chooses to exploit her geographic position in the 
future. If Turkey is looking abroad because she does not have faith in European 
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commitments to her, then it seems likely that Europe will suffer some adverse affects as 
Turkey develops alternate avenues for friendship and economic gain. If, however, Turkey 
feels she is changing her policy with at least tacit European encouragement freely given by 
one friendly nation or bloc to another, then Turkish independence should ultimately be to 
Europe's and Turkey's mutual benefit. 
A Turkey partially outside of the EU and the WEU is not necessarily a bad thing 
so long as both polities know where they stand. The current European policy, though, of 
ambiguity is perceived by Turks as unfair and ultimately may prove harmful to both Turks 
and EU members alike. Europe is still taking Turkey for granted based on a 'business as 
usual' approach. Turkey appears to be exploring other options while keeping the 
European door as fully open as possible. The EU and WEU members need to realize that 
there has been a change in Turkish-European relations and that a more profound one 
could be in the future if Europe does not make her position clear. Essentially, the EU and 
WEU should either tell Turkey that they only want ties that are as close as possible short 
of full membership, or they should clearly link the milestones that are included in the CU 
treaty to future EU and subsequent WEU membership. 
Europeans currently enjoy an unlikely situation. Through CU, they have excellent 
access to the benefits of Turkish EU membership without the responsibility, and through 
NATO they enjoy an equivalent relationship with the WEU. This state is probably not 
sustainable as Turkish leader seek clarification or face the specter of repudiation at home 
for failure to reach closure. The paradigm of Turkish-European relations has already 
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changed once and it seems likely it will shift again--the question is one of 'when' rather 
than 'if' 
Europeans (and Americans) should not expect to be as fortunate when the next 
shift in Turkish foreign policy occurs. The time to act is now and ifEuropeans are 
unwilling to clarifY their position on Turkish integration into the EU and WEU, then the 
United States should be willing to put pressure on the Europeans to do so. 
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APPENDIX A: ORGANIZATIONS OF WHICH TURKEY IS A MEMBER 
Table Al: Organizations of which Turkey is a Member 
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APPENDIX B: SELECTED STATISTICS ON EUROPEAN VIEWS OF TURKEY 
All Statistics are extracts from the Index to International Public Opinion in the edition 
year indicated. 310 
A: INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY OPINIONS AND TURKEY: 
1. Cyprus: 
Table Bl: Optimism on Finding a Solution to the Cyprus Problem 
"How optimistic are you that a viable solution to the Cyprus problem will be found? (pg 
184, September 1987, 1987-1988) 
Table B2: Important Problems for Greek Cypriots 
"Which one of the following problems do you consider as the most important? And which 
one the second most important? (pg 113, September 1987, 1987-1988) 
310 Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings, editors, Index To International Public 
Opinion, various successive years 1987 to 1993, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press). 
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2. France: 
Table B3: French Feelings of Sympathy Towards Other Nations 
"Do you feel sympathy, antipathy or neither sympathy nor antipathy toward the following 




Table B4: French Opinion on Which Countries are Muslim Fundamentalist 
"Can you tell me which, if any, of the following countries are Muslim fundamentalist?" 
(pg. 213 October 1991, 1992-1993)) 
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3. Greece: 
Table 5: Issues oflmportance to Greeks 
"I should like to hear your views on some political issues and problems. Could you please 
tell me for each issue or problem whether you consider it to be very important or not very 
important?" (pg 106, Novermber 1988, 1988-1989) 
Table 6: Should There Be Greek Dialogue with Turkey 
"The following two opinions on Greek-Turkish relations have been expressed. Which one 
do you agree with? (pg. 158, Greater Athen--June 1988, 1988-1989) 
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Table B7: Which Countries Threaten Greece Most? 
"Which one ofthese six countries threatens Greece the most?" (pg 185, Greater Athens--
March 1988, 1988-1989) 
Table BS: Countries with which Greece Should Have Closest Relations 
''With which one (ofthese countries) should Greece have her closest relations?" (pg 185, 
Greater Athens--March 1988, 1988-1989) 
Table B9: Most Important Problem Facing Greece 
"In your opinion, which one on this card today is the country's most important problem?" 
(pg. 132, Greater Athens--July 1989, 1989-1990) 
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4. Great Britain: 
Table BlO: Should Turkey Be Invited into the EU? 
"Do you think Turkey should be invited to join the European Community?" (pg 194, 
November 1992, 1992-1993) 
Table Bll: Is Turkey Part of Asia or Europe? 
"Would you say that Turkey is part of Asia or Europe?" (pg 208, November 1992, 1992-
1993) 
Table B12: Is the Turkish Government Democratic? 
"Do you know whether the government of Turkey is a democratically elected one like in 
Western countries, or is it communist, or is it a dictatorship, or some other system?" (pg 
208, November 1992, 1992-1993) 
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B. EUROPE AND TURKEY: 
Key to Country Abbreviations, "Europe and Turkey" 
B Belgium E Spain NL Netherlands 
DK Denmark F France p Portugal 
DW West Germany IRL Ireland UK United Kingdom 
DE East Germany I Italy 
GR Greece L Luxembourg 
Table B13: European Opinions on Turkey 
"Let's talk about Turkey and the Turkish people. Please tell me for each of the statements 
which I'm going to read whether your agree (yes) or disagree (no). (pgs 657-660, Spring 
1989, 1988-1989) 
Table B14a: Turkey is a Modern Country 
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Table B14b: Turkey Is An Important Partner in Nato 
Table B14c: Turkey is a Democratic Country 
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Table B14d: I'd Like to Visit Turkey One of these Days 
Table B14e: Many Turkish Workers Live in our Country 
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Table B14f: I've Already Gotten to Know Turks 
Table 15: Is Gulf Crisis Support to Allied Embargo Victims a Good or Bad Thing? 
"Please tell me whether you find each of the following actions taken by the European 
Community concerning the Gulf crisis, a good thing or a bad thing?" (pg. 590, 
Eurobarometer # 33--Spring 1990, 1990-1991) 
"Supporting countries which are victims of the embargo: Egypt, Jordan, Turkey" 
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Table B16: How Much Do You Trust in Other Peoples? 
"I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various 
countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust in them, some trust, not 
very much trust or no trust at all. Scores were calculated by applying coefficients of 4, 3, 
2, 1 respectively to the various answer codes. "Don't knows" were excluded. Therefore, 
there was a midpoint of2.50. Below that level negative answers predominate and above it 
positive answers." (pg. 552, Eurobarometer # 33--Spring 1990, 1990-1991) 
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Table B17: Which Countries Should Be EC Members in 2000? 
"If you had the choice, which countries do you think should be part of the European 
Community in the year 2000? For each ofthe countries on this map, please tell me if it 
should be a member of the European Community in the year 2000 or not? (This table is 
an extract from the 43 countries in Europe, CEE, and Asia which were asked about). (pgs 
620-621, Eurobarometer # 38, Fall1992, 1992-1993) 
Table BlS: Which Countries Should Become EC Membership in the'Near Future'? 
"For each of the following countries, are you in favor or not of them becoming part of the 
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